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Abstract
In this paper we design information elicitation mechanisms for Bayesian auctions. While in
Bayesian mechanism design the distributions of the players’ private types are often assumed to
be common knowledge, information elicitation considers the situation where the players know
the distributions better than the decision maker. To weaken the information assumption in
Bayesian auctions, we consider an information structure where the knowledge about the distri-
butions is arbitrarily scattered among the players. In such an unstructured information setting,
we design mechanisms for unit-demand auctions and additive auctions that aggregate the play-
ers’ knowledge, generating revenue that are constant approximations to the optimal Bayesian
mechanisms with a common prior. Our mechanisms are 2-step dominant-strategy truthful and
the revenue increases gracefully with the amount of knowledge the players collectively have.
Keywords. game theory, mechanism design, information elicitation, distributed knowledge,
removing common prior
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1 Introduction
Bayesian auction design has been extremely flourishing since the seminal work of [37]. One of the
main focuses is to generate revenue, by selling m heterogenous items to n players. Each player
has a private valuation function describing how much he values each subset of the items, and the
valuations are drawn from prior distributions. An important assumption in Bayesian mechanism
design is that the distributions are commonly known by the seller and the players —the common
prior assumption. However, as pointed out by another seminal work [41], such common knowledge
is “rarely present in experiments and never in practice”, and “only by repeated weakening of common
knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality.”
In this paper, we weaken the information assumption about the seller and the players by adopting
an information elicitation approach [35]. We consider a framework for auctions where the knowledge
about the players’ value distributions are arbitrarily scattered among the players and the seller. The
seller must aggregate pieces of information from all players to gain a good understanding about the
distributions, so as to decide how to sell the items.
As in information elicitation, the players get rewards for reporting their knowledge. However,
different from classic information elicitation where a player’s utility is exactly his reward, in our
model a player’s utility comes not only from his knowledge, but also from participating in the auction
(i.e., from buying items). Moreover, information elicitation usually assumes the prior distribution is
correlated: each player observes a private signal and reports the corresponding posterior distribution.
This means every player has information about every other player. In our model, following the
convention in multi-item auctions, the players’ value distributions for individual items are assumed
to be independent. A player may be totally ignorant about some players and only partially knows
some other players’ distributions.
We focus on unit-demand auctions and additive auctions —two valuation types widely studied in
the literature [15, 28]. In such auctions, a player’s valuation function is specified bym values, one for
each item. For each player i and item j, the value vij is independently drawn from a distribution Dij .
Each player privately knows his own values and some (or none) of the distributions of some other
players for some items, like long-time competitors in the market. There is no constraint about
who knows which distributions. The seller may also know some of the distributions, but he does
not know which player knows what. A player may or may not know his own value distributions.
However, it is hard to elicit a player’s knowledge about his own distribution, and we are not aware
of any such study in information elicitation. Thus we do not consider the players’ self-knowledge.
We introduce directed knowledge graphs to succinctly describe the players’ knowledge. Each
player knows the distributions of his neighbors, different items’ knowledge graphs may be totally
different, and the structures of the graphs are not known by anybody. Interestingly, the intuition
behind such an information structure has long been considered by philosophers. In [31], the author
discussed a world where “everything in the world might be known by somebody, yet not everything
by the same knower.” Below we briefly state our main results.
1.1 Main Results
Under arbitrary knowledge graphs. Our goal is to design 2-step dominant strategy truthful (2-
DST) information elicitation mechanisms whose expected revenue approximates that of the optimal
Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism, denoted by OPT .1 In order for the seller to
aggregate the players’ knowledge about the distributions, it is natural for the mechanism to ask
each player to report his knowledge to the seller, together with his own values. A 2-DST mechanism
1A Bayesian mechanism is BIC if it is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for all players to report their true values.
1
[4] is such that, (1) no matter what knowledge the players may report about each other, it is dominant
for each player to report his true values; and (2) given that all players report their true values, it is
dominant for each player to report his true knowledge about others.
When the knowledge graphs are such that some distributions are not known by anybody, it is easy
to see that no information elicitation mechanism can be a bounded approximation to OPT . Thus
it is natural to consider the following benchmark: the optimal BIC mechanism applied to players
and items for whom the distributions are indeed known by somebody, denoted by OPTK . This is
a natural benchmark when considering players with limited knowledge and, if every distribution is
known by somebody, then it is exactly OPT . We have the following, formalized in Section 3.
Theorems 1 and 3. (sketched) For any knowledge graph, there is a 2-DST information elicitation
mechanism for unit-demand auctions with revenue ≥ OPTK96 , and such a mechanism for additive
auctions with revenue ≥ OPTK70 .
To prove Theorem 1, we actually show a general result: any Bayesian mechanism for unit-
demand auctions that is a good approximation in the COPIES setting (formally defined in Section
3.2) can be converted to information elicitation mechanisms; see Theorem 2. This applies to a large
class of Bayesian mechanisms, including the ones in [15, 32, 16].
To prove Theorem 3, we have developed a novel approach for using the adjusted revenue [43].
Although this concept is very useful in Bayesian auctions, it was unexpected that we found an
interesting and highly non-trivial way of using it to analyze information elicitation mechanisms.
When everything is known by somebody. When the knowledge graphs become denser, the
amount of knowledge increases and the seller may generate more revenue. Indeed, if every dis-
tribution is known by somebody, OPTK = OPT . We show the revenue that can be generated
by information elicitation mechanisms increases gracefully together with the amount of knowledge.
More precisely, for any integer k ≥ 1, let τk = k
(k+1)
k+1
k
. Note τ1 = 14 and τk → 1 when k gets
larger. We have the following theorems, formalized in Section 4.
Theorems 4 and 5. (sketched) ∀k ∈ [n − 1], when each distribution is known by at least k
players, there is a 2-DST information elicitation mechanism for unit-demand auctions with revenue
≥ τk24 ·OPT , and such a mechanism for additive auctions with revenue ≥ max{
1
11 ,
τk
6+2τk
}OPT .
Finally, by exploring the knowledge graph’s combinatorial structure, we have the following for
single-good auctions.
Theorem 6. (sketched) When the knowledge graph is 2-connected,2 there is a 2-DST information
elicitation mechanism for single-good auctions with revenue ≥ (1− 1
n
)OPT .
1.2 Discussions
The use of scoring rules. Since our mechanisms elicit the players’ knowledge about each other’s
value distributions, we will use scoring rules (see, e.g., [9]) to reward the players for their reported
knowledge, as typical in information elicitation. However, the use of scoring rules does not solve the
main problems in our auctions. Indeed, because a player’s utility comes both from the reward and
from participating in the auction, the difficulties in designing information elicitation mechanisms
are to guarantee that, even without rewarding the players for their knowledge, (1) it is dominant
for each player to report his true values, (2) reporting his true knowledge never hurts him, and (3)
the resulting revenue approximates the desired benchmark.
2A directed graph is 2-connected if for any node i, the graph with i and all adjacent edges removed is still strongly
connected.
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Accordingly, in Sections 3 and 4 we focus on designing information elicitation mechanisms with-
out rewarding the players. Scoring rules are used later solely to break the utility-ties and make it
strictly better for a player to report his true knowledge. In Appendix C, we show how to add scoring
rules to our mechanisms.
Extensions of our results. In our main results, the seller asks the players to report the dis-
tributions in their entirety, without being concerned with the communication complexity for doing
so. This is common in information elicitation and allows us to focus on the main difficulties in
aggregating the players’ knowledge. In Appendix D, we show how to modify our mechanisms so
that the players only report a small amount of information about the distributions.
Furthermore, in the main body of this paper we consider auction settings where a player i’s
knowledge about another player i′ for an item j is exactly the prior distribution Di′j . This simplifies
the description of the knowledge graphs. In Appendix E, we consider settings where a player may
observe private signals about other players and can further refine the prior.
Future directions. As Bayesian auctions require the seller (and the players under common-prior
assumption) has correct knowledge about all distributions, in our main results we do not consider
scenarios where players have “insider” knowledge. If the insider knowledge is correct (i.e., is a
refinement of the prior), then our mechanisms’ revenue increases; see Appendix E. Still, how to
aggregate even the incorrect information that the players may have about each other is a very
interesting question for future studies.
Another important direction is to elicit players’ information for BIC mechanisms. For example,
the BIC mechanisms in [23, 10] are optimal in their own settings, and it is unclear how to convert
them to information elicitation mechanisms.
1.3 Related Work
Information elicitation. Following [35], information elicitation has become an important re-
search area in the past decade [38, 44, 33]. A mechanism asks each player to report his private
signal and his private knowledge about the prior distribution. The decision maker wants the mech-
anism to be BIC, and a player is rewarded based on his reported distribution and the other players’
reported signals. Different from auctions, there are no allocations or prices, and a player’s utility
equals his reward. Proper scoring rules [9, 22] are widely used. In Appendix C, we will formally
define scoring rules and use them to reward the players for their knowledge.
Most studies on information elicitation require a common prior. Mechanisms without this as-
sumption are considered by [42], and our work is information elicitation in auctions without a
common prior. Moreover, information elicitation does not consider the players to have any cost for
revealing their knowledge. It would be interesting to include such costs in the general model as well
as in ours, to see how the mechanisms will change accordingly.
Bayesian auction design. In his seminal work [37], Myerson introduced the first optimal Bayesian
mechanism for single-good auctions, which also applies to many single-parameter settings [1]. Since
then, there has been a huge literature on designing (approximately) optimal Bayesian mechanisms
that are either BIC or dominant-strategy truthful (DST); see [29] for an introduction to this lit-
erature. Mechanisms for multi-parameter settings have been constructed recently. In [10], the
authors characterize optimal BIC mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. For unit-demand auc-
tions, [15, 16, 32, 11] construct DST Bayesian mechanisms that are constant approximations. For
additive auctions, [28, 34, 43, 11] provide logarithmic or constant approximations under different
conditions. Finally, for subadditive auctions, logarithmic or constant approximations are provided
in [5, 17, 12].
3
Removing the common prior assumption. Following [41], a lot of effort has been made to
remove the common prior assumption. In DST Bayesian mechanisms it suffices to assume that the
seller knows the prior distribution. In prior-free mechanisms [30, 24] the distribution is unknown
and the seller learns it from the values of randomly selected players. In [21, 25, 36] the seller observes
independent samples from the distribution before the auction begins. In [19, 20] the players have
arbitrary possibilistic belief hierarchies about each other. In robust mechanism design [7] the players
have arbitrary probabilistic belief hierarchies. In crowdsourced Bayesian auctions [4] each player
privately knows all the distributions (or their refinements), which is a special case of our model.
Indeed, all knowledge graphs will be complete graphs under their setting (that is, everybody knows
everything), while we allow arbitrary knowledge graphs. In Appendixes E and F we further discuss
how to elicit the players’ knowledge refinements, and how to handle correlated distributions in a
setting that is a special case of our model but is still more general than that of [4].
2 Preliminaries
In this work, we focus on multi-item auctions with n players (denoted by N) and m items (denoted
by M). A player i’s value for an item j, vij, is independently drawn from a distribution Dij . Let
vi = (vij)j∈M , Di = ×j∈MDij and D = ×i∈NDi. Player i’s value for a subset S of items ismaxj∈S vij
in unit-demand auctions, and is
∑
j∈S vij in additive auctions. The players’ utilities, denoted by ui,
are quasi-linear, and the players are risk-neutral.
Knowledge graphs. It is illustrative to model the players’ knowledge graphically. 3 We consider
a vector of knowledge graphs, G = (Gj)i∈M , one for each item. Each Gj is a directed graph with n
nodes, one for each player. For any i 6= i′, an edge (i, i′) is in Gj if and only if player i knows Di′j .
There is no constraint about the knowledge graphs: the same player’s distributions for different
items may be known by different players, different players’ distributions for the same item may also
be known by different players, and some distributions may not be known by anybody. Each player
knows his own out-going edges, and neither the players nor the seller knows the whole graph.
We measure the amount of knowledge in the system by the number of players knowing each
distribution. For any k ∈ {0, 1 . . . , n − 1}, a knowledge graph is k-informed if each node has
in-degree at least k: a player’s distribution is known by at least k other players. The vector G
is k-informed if all knowledge graphs are so. Note that every knowledge graph is 0-informed, and
“everything is known by somebody” when k ≥ 1. A common prior would imply all knowledge graphs
are complete directed graphs, or (n − 1)-informed, which is the strongest condition in our model.
The seller’s knowledge can be naturally incorporated into the knowledge graphs by considering him
as a special “player 0”. All our mechanisms can easily utilize the seller’s knowledge, and we will not
further discuss this issue.
Information elicitation mechanisms. Let Iˆ = (N,M,D) be a Bayesian auction instance and
I = (N,M,D, G) a corresponding information elicitation instance, where G is a knowledge graph
vector. Different from Bayesian mechanisms, which has D as input, an information elicitation
mechanism has neither D nor G as input. Instead, it asks each player i to report a valuation
bi = (bij)j∈M and a knowledge Ki = ×i′ 6=i,j∈MDii′j —a distribution for the valuation subprofile v−i.
3We could have defined the players’ knowledge using the standard notion in epistemic game theory [27, 3, 26]:
roughly speaking, the state space consists of all possible distributions of the valuation profile, and player i knows
Di′j if he is in an information set where all distributions have the (i
′, j)-th component equal to Di′j . However, the
knowledge graph is a more succinct representation and is enough for the purpose of this work.
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Ki may contain “⊥” at some places, indicating i does not know the corresponding distributions. Ki
is i’s true knowledge if Dii′j = Di′j whenever (i, i
′) ∈ Gj , and Dii′j = ⊥ otherwise. An information
elicitation mechanism maps a strategy profile (bi,Ki)i∈N to an allocation and a price profile, and
may be randomized. To distinguish whether a mechanism M is a Bayesian or an information
elicitation mechanism, we may explicitly write M(Iˆ) or M(I). The (expected) revenue of M is
denoted by Rev(M), and sometimes by EDRev(M) to emphasize the distribution.
An information elicitation mechanism is 2-step dominant strategy truthful (2-DST) if
(1) For any player i, true valuation vi, valuation bi, knowledge Ki, and strategy subprofile s−i =
(bj ,Kj)j 6=i of the other players, ui((vi,Ki), s−i) ≥ ui((bi,Ki), s−i).
(2) For any player i, true valuation vi, true knowledge Ki, knowledgeK ′i, and knowledge subprofile
K ′−i(v−i) = (K
′
j(vj))j 6=i of the other players, where each K
′
j(vj) is a function of player j’s true
valuation vj, Ev−i∼D−iui((vi,Ki), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))) ≥ Ev−i∼D−iui((vi,K
′
i), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))).
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3 Under Arbitrary Knowledge Graphs
3.1 Knowledge-Based Revenue Benchmark
When the knowledge graphs can be totally arbitrary, some distributions may not be known by
anybody. It is not hard to see that in this case, no information elicitation mechanism can be
a bounded approximation to OPT . Indeed, if all but one value distributions of the players are
constantly 0, and if the only non-zero distribution, denoted by Dij, is unknown by anybody, then a
Bayesian mechanism can find the optimal reserve price based on Dij , while an information elicitation
mechanism can only set the price for player i based on the reported values of the other players,
which are all 0.
Thus, for arbitrary knowledge graphs, we define a natural revenue benchmark: the optimal
Bayesian revenue on players and items for which the distributions are known in the information
elicitation setting. More precisely, let Iˆ = (N,M,D) be a Bayesian instance and I = (N,M,D, G)
a corresponding information elicitation instance. Let D′ = ×i∈N,j∈MD′ij be such that D
′
ij = Dij
if there exists a player i′ with (i′, i) ∈ Gj , and D′ij is constantly 0 otherwise. We refer to D
′ as
D projected on G. Letting I ′ = (N,M,D′) be the resulting Bayesian instance, the knowledge-
based revenue benchmark is OPTK(I) , OPT (I ′), the optimal BIC revenue on I ′. This is a
demanding benchmark in information elicitation settings: it takes into consideration the knowledge
of all players, no matter who knows what. When everything is known by somebody, even if G is
only 1-informed, we will have I ′ = Iˆ and OPTK(I) = OPT (Iˆ).
3.2 Unit-Demand Auctions
For unit-demand auctions, sequential post-price Bayesian mechanisms have been constructed by
[16, 32]. For information elicitation, if the seller asks the players to report both their values and
knowledge, and directly uses the reported distributions in these mechanisms, then a player may
want to withhold his knowledge about the other players. By doing so, a player may prevent the
seller from selling the items to the others, so that the items are still available when it is his turn to
buy.
A simple idea is to partition the players into two groups: a set of reporters who will not receive
any item and is only asked to report their knowledge; and a set of potential buyers whose knowledge
4In Appendix C, we introduce scoring rules to our mechanisms so that the inequality is strict whenever K′i 6= Ki.
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is never used. It is possible that the reported knowledge may not contain a potential buyer’s value
distributions on all items, thus the technical part is to prove that the seller generates a good revenue
even though the players’ knowledge is only partially recovered.
Our mechanism MIEUD is simple and intuitive; see Mechanism 1, where MUD is the Bayesian
mechanism of [32]. It’s worth pointing out that, although mechanism MUD is used as a black-box,
Mechanism 1 is not a reduction from arbitrary Bayesian mechanisms. Instead, we will prove a
projection lemma that allows such a reduction from an important class of Bayesian mechanisms,
where mechanism MUD is an important example. We have the following theorem, whose proof is
sketched below and formal proof is provided in Appendix A.1.
Mechanism 1 . MIEUD
1: Each player i reports to the seller a valuation bi = (bij)j∈M and a knowledge Ki = (Dii′j)i′ 6=i,j∈M .
2: Randomly partition the players into two sets, N1 and N2, where each player is independently
put in each set with probability 12 .
3: Set N3 = ∅.
4: for players i ∈ N1 lexicographically do
5: For each player i′ ∈ N2 and item j ∈M , if D′i′j has not been defined yet and D
i
i′j 6= ⊥, then
set D′i′j = D
i
i′j and add player i
′ to N3.
6: end for
7: For each i ∈ N3 and j ∈M such that D′ij is not defined, set D
′
ij ≡ 0 (i.e., 0 with probability 1)
and bij = 0.
8: Run mechanism MUD on the unit-demand Bayesian auction (N3,M, (D′ij)i∈N3,j∈M), with the
players’ values being (bij)i∈N3,j∈M . Let x
′ = (x′ij)i∈N3, j∈M be the resulting allocation where
x′ij ∈ {0, 1}, and let p
′ = (p′i)i∈N3 be the prices. Without loss of generality, x
′
ij = 0 if D
′
ij ≡ 0.
9: For each player i 6∈ N3, i gets no item and his price is pi = 0.
10: For each player i ∈ N3, i gets item j if x′ij = 1, and his price is pi = p
′
i.
Theorem 1. Mechanism MIEUD for unit-demand auctions is 2-DST and, for any instances Iˆ =
(N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G), Rev(MIEUD(I)) ≥
OPTK(I)
96 .
Lemma 1. Mechanism MIEUD is 2-DST.
Proof sketch. The key is that the use of the players’ values and the use of their knowledge are
disentangled: for players in N1, the mechanism only uses their knowledge but not their values; and
the opposite holds for players in N2. If a player i ends up in N2, then whether he is in N3 or not
does not depend on his own strategy. As mechanism MUD is DST and player i is assigned to N2
with positive probability, it is dominant for him to report his true values in MIEUD, no matter
what the reported knowledge is. Moreover, if a player i ends up in N1, then he is guaranteed to get
no item and pay 0, thus reporting his true knowledge never hurts him.
In Appendix C, we add scoring rules to mechanism MIEUD to reward the players’ knowledge,
so that a player’s utility will be strictly larger when he reports his true knowledge than when he
lies about it.
To analyze the revenue of MIEUD, note that it runs the Bayesian mechanism on a smaller
(randomized) Bayesian instance: Iˆ projected to the player-item pairs (i, j) such that i ∈ N3 and
Dij has been reported. To understand how much revenue is lost by the projection, we consider
the COPIES instance [16], IˆCP = (NCP ,MCP ,DCP ), as a bridge between the original Bayesian
instance and the information elicitation instance. IˆCP is obtained from Iˆ by replacing each player
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with m copies and each item with n copies, where a player i’s copy j only wants item j’s copy i, with
the value distributed according to Dij . Thus IˆCP is a single-parameter auction, with NCP = N×M ,
MCP = M ×N , and DCP = ×(i,j)∈NCPDij .
We now lower-bound the optimal BIC revenue in the projected COPIES instance. For any subset
NM ⊆ N ×M , let IˆCPNM be Iˆ
CP projected to NM . By definition, OPT (IˆCPNM ) is the optimal BIC
revenue for IˆCPNM . Moreover, let OPT (Iˆ
CP )NM be the revenue of the optimal BIC mechanism for
IˆCP obtained from players in NM .
Lemma 2 (The projection lemma). For any Iˆ and NM ⊆ N ×M , OPT (IˆCPNM) ≥ OPT (Iˆ
CP )NM .
We elaborate the related definitions and prove Lemma 2 in Appendix A.1. Given mechanism
MIEUD, the subset NM is the set of player-item pairs (i, j) such that i ∈ N3 and Dij is reported.
Theorem 1 holds by combining the projection lemma, the randomized partition in MIEUD, and the
results on COPIES setting in Bayesian auctions [32, 11].
Note that Lemma 2 is only concerned with COPIES instances. Using this lemma and similar to
our proof of Theorem 1, any Bayesian mechanism M whose revenue can be properly lower-bounded
by the COPIES instance can be converted to an information elicitation mechanism in a black-box
way. We have the following theorem, with the proof omitted.
Theorem 2. Let M be any DST Bayesian mechanism such that Rev(M(Iˆ)) ≥ αOPT (IˆCP ) for
some α > 0. There exists a 2-DST information elicitation mechanism that uses M as a black-box
and is a α16 -approximation to OPTK .
By Theorem 2, the mechanisms in [15] and [16] automatically imply information elicitation
mechanisms. For single-good auctions, replacing mechanism MUD with Myerson’s mechanism, the
information elicitation mechanism is a 4-approximation to OPTK .
3.3 Additive Auctions
Information elicitation mechanisms for additive auctions are harder to construct and analyze than
for unit-demand auctions. First, randomly partitioning the players as before may cause a significant
revenue loss, as the revenue of additive auctions may come from selling a subset of items as a bundle
to a player i. Even when i’s value distribution for each item is reported with constant probability,
the probability that his distributions for all items in the bundle are reported may be very low, thus
the mechanism may rarely sell the bundle to i at the optimal price. Second, the seller can no longer
“throw away” player-item pairs whose distributions are not reported and focus on the projected
instance. When the players are not partitioned into reporters and potential buyers, doing so may
cause a player to lie and withhold his knowledge about others, so that they are thrown away.
To simultaneously achieve truthfulness and a good revenue guarantee, our mechanism is very
stingy and never throws away any information. If a player i’s value distribution for an item j is
reported by others, then j may be sold to i via the β-Bundling mechanism of [43], denoted by Bund.
If i’s distribution for j is not reported, then j may still be sold to i via the second-price mechanism.
Indeed, our mechanism handles the players neither solely based on the original Bayesian instance Iˆ
nor solely based on the projected instance I ′. Rather, it works on a hybrid of the two.
Our mechanism MIEA is still simple; see Mechanism 2. However, significant effort is needed
to analyze its revenue. Indeed, note that in Mechanism 2, each Mi is defined according to the
original Bayesian instance Iˆ , while the partition of M is done according to the knowledge graphs
in the information elicitation instance I . The mechanism Bund is run on a hybrid instance, where
βi is based on Iˆ and D′i is based on I . Finally, part of player i’s winning set is sold according to
mechanism Bund and part of it is sold using second-price.
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Mechanism 2 . MIEA
1: Each player i reports a valuation bi = (bij)j∈M and a knowledge Ki = (Dii′j)i′ 6=i,j∈M .
2: For each item j, set i∗(j) = argmaxi bij (ties broken lexicographically) and pj = maxi 6=i∗ bij .
3: for each player i do
4: Let Mi = {j | i∗(j) = i} be player i’s winning set.
5: Partition M into M1i and M
2
i as follows: ∀j ∈M
1
i , some i
′ has reported Di
′
ij 6= ⊥ (if there are
more than one reporters, take the lexicographically first); and ∀j ∈M2i , D
i′
ij = ⊥ for all i
′.
6: ∀j ∈M1i , set D
′
ij = D
i′
ij; and ∀j ∈M
2
i , set D
′
ij ≡ 0.
7: Compute the optimal entry fee ei and reserve prices (p′j)j∈M1i according to mechanism Bund
with respect to (D′i, βi), where βij = maxi′ 6=i bi′j ∀j ∈ M . By the definition of Bund, we
always have p′j ≥ βij for each j. If ei = 0 then it is possible that p
′
j > βij for some j; while if
ei > 0 then p′j = βij for every j.
8: Sell M1i ∩Mi to player i according to Bund. That is, if ei > 0 then do the following: if∑
j∈M1i ∩Mi
bij ≥ ei +
∑
j∈M1i ∩Mi
p′j, player i gets M
1
i ∩ Mi with price ei +
∑
j∈M1i ∩Mi
p′j;
otherwise the items in M1i ∩Mi are not sold. If ei = 0 then do the following: for each item
j ∈M1i ∩Mi, if bij ≥ p
′
j, player i gets item j with price p
′
j; otherwise item j is not sold.
9: In addition, sell each item j in M2i ∩Mi to player i with price pj(= βij).
10: end for
Although running Bund on I ′ achieves a constant approximation to OPT (I ′), some items sold
by Bund under I ′ may end up being sold by MIEA using second-price, and the revenue of MIEA
cannot be lower-bounded by that of Bund on I ′. To overcome this difficulty, we develop a novel way
to use the adjusted revenue [43] in our analysis; see Lemmas 4 and 6 in Appendix A.2, where we also
recall the related definitions. As we show there, the adjusted revenue in a hybrid information setting,
combined with the revenue of the second-price sale, eventually provides a desirable lower-bound to
the revenue of MIEA. We have the following theorem, proved in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 3. Mechanism MIEA for additive auctions is 2-DST and, for any instances Iˆ =
(N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G), Rev(MIEA(I)) ≥
OPTK(I)
70 .
4 When Everything Is Known by Somebody
When the knowledge graph vector G is k-informed with k ≥ 1, “everything is known by somebody”
and OPTK = OPT . Both mechanisms in Section 3 of course apply here, but we can do better when
k gets larger: that is, when the amount of knowledge in the system increases.
4.1 Unit-Demand Auctions and Additive Auctions
For unit-demand auctions, mechanism M′IEUD here is almost the same as mechanism MIEUD,
except it randomly partitions the players differently. The probability that each player is assigned
to N1 is now q = 1 − (k + 1)−
1
k , and the probability to N2 is 1 − q. When k = 1, we have q = 12
and mechanism M′IEUD is exactly as before. The probability q is chosen to achieve the maximum
probability for each distribution to be reported, and the latter is exactly τk =
k
(k+1)
k+1
k
. We only
state the theorem below, proved in Appendix B.1.
Theorem 4. ∀k ∈ [n−1], any unit-demand auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G)
where G is k-informed, mechanism M′IEUD is 2-DST and Rev(M
′
IEUD(I)) ≥
τk
24 ·OPT (Iˆ).
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As k gets larger (although can still be much smaller than n), the approximation ratio ofM′IEUD
approaches 24, the best known approximation to OPT by DST Bayesian mechanisms [32, 11].
For additive auctions, to improve the approximation ratio when k ≥ 1, following [11] we can
divide the β-Bundling mechanism into the “bundling part” and the “individual sale part”. The
former is referred to as the Bundle VCG mechanism, denoted by BV CG; and the latter is the
individual 1-lookahead mechanism, denoted by M1LA, which sells each item separately using the
1-lookahead mechanism of [40]. Mechanism M1LA can also be replaced by the individual Myerson
mechanism, denoted by IM , which sells each item separately using Myerson’s mechanism. By
choosing the mechanism that generates a higher expected revenue between IM and BV CG, [11]
provides a Bayesian mechanism that is an 8-approximation to OPT .
We design corresponding information elicitation mechanisms separately for mechanisms BV CG
and IM . The resulting mechanisms are denoted by MIEBV CG and MIEIM , which are defined
in Appendix B.2. Because the seller does not know the prior D, he cannot compute the expected
revenue of the two information elicitation mechanisms and choose the better one. Instead, we let him
choose between the two mechanisms randomly, according to a probability distribution depending on
k. It is worth pointing out that when k ≥ 1, mechanismMIEBV CG is able to recover all distributions
in Iˆ, thus its revenue equals the corresponding Bayesian revenue, which is lower-bounded in [11].
For MIEIM , information elicitation is done by randomized partition depending on the value of k.
However, we can do even better. Indeed, although in Bayesian auctions the mechanism IM
is optimal for individual item-sale and outperforms mechanism M1LA, in information elicitation
auctions there is a tradeoff between the two. In order for the players to report their knowledge
truthfully for mechanism IM , we need to randomly partition them into reporters and potential
buyers, thus each distribution is only recovered with probability τk. In contrast, no partition
is needed for aggregating the players’ knowledge in mechanism M1LA, and we can recover all
distributions simultaneously with probability 1. The resulting information elicitation mechanism,
MIE1LA, is also defined in the appendix. As mechanism M1LA is a 2-approximation to mechanism
IM , sometimes it is actually more advantageous to use MIE1LA rather than MIEIM , depending
on the value of k.
Properly combining the above gadgets together, our mechanism M′IEA is defined as follows:
when k ≤ 7, it runs MIEBV CG with probability 211 and MIE1LA with probability
9
11 ; when k > 7,
it runs MIEBV CG with probability
τk
3+τk
and MIEIM with probability 33+τk . The choice of the two
cases is to achieve the best approximation ratio for each k. We have the following theorem, proved
in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 5. ∀k ∈ [n − 1], any additive auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G)
where G is k-informed, M′IEA is 2-DST and Rev(M
′
IEA(I)) ≥ max{
1
11 ,
τk
6+2τk
}OPT (Iˆ).
The same paradigm can be applied to arbitrary knowledge graphs. However, when not everything
is known, the bundling part does not recover all distributions in Iˆ and a more complex analysis is
needed to lower-bound its revenue, essentially still via adjusted revenue.
4.2 Single-Good Auctions with 2-Connected Knowledge Graphs
As we have seen, the amount of revenue our mechanisms generate increases with k, the amount of
knowledge in the system. If the knowledge graph is only k-informed for some small k, but reflects
certain combinatorial structures, good revenue may also be generated by leveraging such structures.
In this subsection we consider single-good auctions, so a player’s value vi is a single number rather
than a vector. Following Lemma 8 in Appendix B.2, for any k ≥ 1, when there is a single item
and the knowledge graph is k-informed, mechanism MIEIM is a τk-approximation to the optimal
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Bayesian mechanism of Myerson [37]. Below we construct an information elicitation mechanism
that is nearly optimal under a natural structure of the knowledge graph.
More precisely, recall that a directed graph is strongly connected if there is a directed path from
any node i to any other node i′. Intuitively, in a knowledge graph this means that for any two
players Alice and Bob, Alice knows a guy who knows a guy ... who knows Bob. Also recall that
a directed graph is 2-connected if it remains strongly connected after removing any single node
and the adjacent edges. In a knowledge graph, this means there does not exist a crucial player
as an “information hub”, without whom the players will split into two parts, with one part having
no information about the other. It is easy to see that a knowledge graph being strong connected
(or 2-connected respectively) implies it being 1-informed (or 2-informed respectively), but not vice
versa. In fact, a graph of n nodes can be (⌊n2 ⌋ − 1)-informed without being connected.
When the knowledge graph is 2-connected, we construct the information elicitation Myerson
mechanismMIEM in Mechanism 3. Recall that Myerson’s mechanism maps each player i’s reported
value bi to the (ironed) virtual value, φi(bi;Di). It runs the second-price mechanism with reserve
price 0 on virtual values and maps the resulting “virtual price” back to the winner’s value space, as
his price.
Mechanism 3 MIEM
1: Each player i reports a value bi and a knowledge Ki = (Dij)j∈N\{i}.
2: Randomly choose a player a, let S = {j | Daj 6= ⊥}, N
′ = N \ ({a} ∪ S), and D′j = D
a
j ∀j ∈ S.
3: If S = ∅, the item is unsold, the mechanism sets price pi = 0 for each i ∈ N and stop here.
4: Set i∗ = argmaxj∈S φj(bj ;D
′
j), with ties broken lexicographically.
5: while N ′ 6= ∅ do
6: Set S′ = {j | j ∈ N ′, ∃i′ ∈ S \ {i∗} s.t. Di
′
j 6= ⊥}.
7: If S′ = ∅ then go to Step 12.
8: For each j ∈ S′, set D′j = D
i′
j , where i
′ is the first player in S \ {i∗} with Di
′
j 6= ⊥.
9: Set S = {i∗} ∪ S′ and N ′ = N ′ \ S′.
10: Set i∗ = argmaxj∈S φj(bj ;D
′
j), with ties broken lexicographically.
11: end while
12: Set φsecond = maxj∈N\({a,i∗}∪N ′) φj(bj ;D
′
j) and the price pi = 0 for each player i.
13: If φi∗(bi∗ ;D′i∗) < 0 then the item is unsold; otherwise, the item is sold to player i
∗ and pi∗ =
φ−1i∗ (max{φsecond, 0};D
′
i∗).
To help understanding our mechanism, we illustrate in Figure 2 of Appendix B.3 the sets of
players involved in the first round. We have the following theorem, proved in Appendix B.4.
Theorem 6. For any single-good auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G) where G
is 2-connected, MIEM is 2-DST and Rev(MIEM (I)) ≥ (1−
1
n
)OPT (Iˆ).
Proof ideas. The mechanism disentangles the use of the players’ values and the use of their knowl-
edge, but in a more subtle and stingy way than randomized partition. Indeed, when computing a
player’s virtual value in Step 10, his knowledge has not been used yet. If he is player i∗ then his
knowledge will not be used in the next round either. Only when a player is removed from S —that
is, when it is guaranteed that he will not get the item, will his knowledge be used. This is why it
never hurts a player to report his true knowledge.
Now consider the revenue when the players report their true values and true knowledge. Note
that |S| ≥ 2 in Step 2 due to 2-connectedness, so the mechanism does not stop in Step 3. In the
iterative steps, because player i∗ is excluded from the set of reporters, we need that there is still a
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reporter who knows a distribution for players in N ′: that is, there is an edge from N \ (N ′ ∪ {i∗})
to N ′, and player i∗ is not an “information hub” between N \N ′ and N ′. This is again guaranteed
by 2-connectedness (note that strong connectedness alone is not enough). Accordingly, MIEM does
not stop until N ′ = ∅ and all players’ distributions have been reported (excluding, perhaps, that
of player a). Therefore MIEM recovers Iˆ and runs Myerson’s mechanism on it after randomly
excluding a player a, and the revenue guarantee follows.
If the seller knows at least two distributions, the mechanism can use him as the starting point
and the revenue will be exactly OPT . Since no information elicitation mechanism can be a (12 + δ)-
approximation for any constant δ > 0 when n = 2 [4], our result is tight. Interestingly, after
obtaining our result, we found that 2-connected graphs have been explored several times in the
game theory literature [6, 39], for totally different problems.
For additive auctions, when the knowledge graphs are 2-connected, instead of using mechanism
MIE1LA or MIEIM , one can use MIEM for each item j. We thus have the following corollary,
where the mechanism M′′IEA runs MIEM with probability
3
4 and MIEBV CG with probability
1
4 .
Corollary 1. For any additive auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G) where each
Gj is 2-connected, mechanism M
′′
IEA is 2-DST and ED Rev(M
′′
IEA(I)) ≥
1
8 (1−
1
n
)OPT (Iˆ).
It would be very interesting to see if other combinatorial structures of knowledge graphs can
be leveraged in information elicitation mechanisms and facilitate the aggregation of the players’
knowledge.
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Appendix
A Proofs for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1. (restated) Mechanism MIEUD is 2-DST.
Proof. We start with the first requirement in the solution concept: it is the best for a player to
report his true values, no matter what knowledge he reports and what strategies the others use.
Claim 1. For any player i, true valuation vi, valuation bi, knowledge Ki, and strategy subprofile
s−i = (bj ,Kj)j 6=i of the other players, EMIEUDui((vi,Ki), s−i) ≥ EMIEUDui((bi,Ki), s−i), where
the expectation is taken over the mechanism’s random coins.
Proof. If player i is not in N3 given the mechanism’s randomness and the reported knowledge of all
players, then his reported valuation is never used to compute his allocation or price, and he gets
the same utility for reporting any valuation. Thus ui((vi,Ki), s−i) = ui((bi,Ki), s−i) conditional on
i /∈ N3.
If player i is in N3, then his utility is determined by MUD. If D′ij is defined to be 0 with
probability 1 in Step 7, then i’s reported value for item j is not given to MUD as input, and i gets
the same utility for reporting any value for j, including vij. Moreover, because i does not get such
an item j, his utility is the same as an imaginary player iˆ whose valuation is the same as i’s, except
that the true value of iˆ for j is 0. Since MUD is DST, no matter what the distributions are and
what values the other players report, it is the best for iˆ to report his true valuation. Accordingly, it
is the best for i to report his true valuation vi as well. That is, ui((vi,Ki), s−i) ≥ ui((bi,Ki), s−i)
conditional on i ∈ N3.
Combining these two cases, Claim 1 holds.
We now prove the second requirement in the solution concept: given that all players report their
true valuations, it is the best for a player to report his true knowledge.
Claim 2. For any player i, true valuation vi, true knowledge Ki, knowledge K
′
i, and knowledge
subprofile K ′−i(v−i) = (K
′
j(vj))j 6=i of the other players, where each K
′
j(vj) is a function of player
j’s true valuation vj, Ev−i∼D−iui((vi,Ki), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))) ≥ Ev−i∼D−iui((vi,K
′
i), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))).
Proof. If player i is in N1, then he is guaranteed to get no item and pay 0, so his utility is 0 no matter
which knowledge he reports. If player i is in N2, then his knowledge is never used, and he again gets
the same utility no matter which knowledge he reports. Thus Ev−i∼D−iui((vi,Ki), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))) =
Ev−i∼D−iui((vi,K
′
i), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))) and Claim 2 holds.
Lemma 1 follows directly from Claims 1 and 2.
The COPIES setting. Before analyzing the revenue of mechanism MIEUD, we first recall the
COPIES setting for reducing multi-parameter settings to single-parameter settings [16]. Given a
unit-demand auction instance Iˆ = (N,M,D), the corresponding COPIES instance is constructed
as follows. We make m copies for each player, called player copies, and denote the resulting player
set by NCP = N ×M . We make n copies for each item, called item copies, and denote the resulting
item set by MCP = M ×N . Each player copy (i, j) has value vij ∼ Dij for the item copy (j, i), and
0 for all the other item copies.
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The set of feasible allocations in the original unit-demand auction naturally defines the set of
feasible allocations in the COPIES auction: for any feasible allocation A in the original setting, if
player i gets item j, then in the corresponding allocation in the COPIES setting, player i’s copy j
gets item j’s copy i, and all other copies of i get nothing. Since in the original setting each item
is sold to at most one player, in the COPIES setting, for all copies of the same item, at most one
of them is sold. Moreover, since each player gets one item in the original setting, in the COPIES
setting, for all copies of the same player, at most one of them gets an item copy. We denote by
IˆCP = (NCP ,MCP ,DCP ) the COPIES instance, with DCP = ×(i,j)∈NCPDij.
The projected setting. Next, we consider the optimal Bayesian revenue for the COPIES setting
when “projected” to smaller instances. Let NM ⊆ N ×M be a subset of player-item pairs and N ′
be NM projected to N . The unit-demand instance IˆNM = (N ′,M,D′N ′), referred to as Iˆ projected
to NM , is such that D′ij = Dij if (i, j) ∈ NM , and D
′
ij ≡ 0 otherwise.
Let IˆCPNM = (N
′CP ,MCP ,D′CPN ′ ) be the COPIES instance corresponding to IˆNM . It can also
be considered as IˆCP projected to NM . That is, when projecting a COPIES instance to a set of
player-item pairs, we still want the resulting instance to be a COPIES instance, thus we patch it up
with the missing player-item pairs but with values constantly 0. The relations of these instances are
illustrated in Figure 1. We are interested in the optimal Bayesian revenue under IˆCPNM , OPT (Iˆ
CP
NM ).
projection
Iˆ
IˆNM
❄
✲
✲
projection
IˆCP
IˆCPNM
❄
COPIES
COPIES
Figure 1: Relations of the COPIES and the projected instances
Let OPT (IˆCP )NM be the revenue of the optimal Bayesian mechanism for IˆCP obtained from
NM : that is, for any pair (i, j) /∈ NM , the price paid by the j-th copy of player i is not counted,
even though this player copy may get the i-th copy of item j according to the optimal mechanism
for IˆCP . We have the following lemma, where we explicitly write out the distributions for different
Bayesian instances.
Lemma 2. (The projection lemma, restated) For any Iˆ and NM ⊆ N ×M ,
E
D′CP
N′
OPT (IˆCPNM) ≥ E
DCP
OPT (IˆCP )NM .
Proof. Given the instance IˆCPNM , consider a Bayesian mechanism M
′ as follows:
• Patch up the instance to be exactly IˆCP , including changing the distribution D′ij from 0 to
Dij for any (i, j) with i ∈ N ′ and (i, j) /∈ NM ;
• For any (i, j) ∈ NM , let i’s copy j report his value, while for any (i, j) 6∈ NM , sample the
value of i’s copy j from Dij ;
• Run the optimal DST Bayesian mechanism on IˆCP , with the reported and the sampled values;5
5Since COPIES is a single-parameter setting, Myerson’s mechanism is both the optimal BIC mechanism and the
optimal DST mechanism here. In particular, the optimal BIC revenue equals the optimal DST revenue.
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• Project the resulting outcome to NM .
The key is to show that M′ is a DST Bayesian mechanism for IˆCPNM . Indeed, for any (i, j) such
that i ∈ N ′ and (i, j) /∈ NM , the value of i’s copy j in IˆCPNM is 0 with probability 1, his reported
value is not used by M′, and at the end this player copy gets nothing and pays 0. Therefore it is
dominant for this player copy to report his true value 0. For any (i, j) ∈ NM , the utility of i’s
copy j under M′ is the same as that under the optimal DST Bayesian mechanism on IˆCP . As it is
dominant for this player copy to report his true value in the latter, so is it in M′. Accordingly,
E
D′CP
N′
OPT (IˆCPNM) ≥ E
D′CP
N′
Rev(M′(IˆCPNM )),
by the definition of OPT . By construction we have
E
D′CP
N′
Rev(M′(IˆCPNM )) = E
DCP
OPT (IˆCP )NM ,
thus Lemma 2 holds.
Note that the projection lemma is not true for non-COPIES settings in general, because the
corresponding mechanism M′ is not DST. Indeed, when the same player i has (i, j) ∈ NM and
(i, j′) /∈ NM for some items j and j′, he prefers receiving j to receiving j′ in the patched-up auction,
even if the former leads to a smaller utility: his projected utility will be 0 under the latter.
Now we are ready to finish the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. (restated) Mechanism MIEUD for unit-demand auctions is 2-DST and, for any
instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G), Ev∼DRev(MIEUD(I)) ≥
OPTK(I)
96 .
Proof. Letting I ′ = (N,M,D′) be the Bayesian instance where D′ is D projected on the knowl-
edge graph G, the COPIES instance I ′CP is respectively defined. Following Lemma 1 and by the
definition of OPTK , it remains to show
Ev∼DRev(MIEUD(I)) ≥
OPT (I ′)
96
.
For any player i and item j with Dij known by some other players, we have
Pr(Dij is reported in the mechanism) = Pr(i ∈ N2) Pr(∃i
′ ∈ N1 s.t. (i
′, i) ∈ Gj | i ∈ N2)
≥
1
2
·
1
2
=
1
4
,
where the inequality is because there exists at least one player i′ with (i′, i) ∈ Gj , and players i and
i′ are partitioned independently. Below we use NM3 to denote the set of player-item pairs whose
distribution is reported in the mechanism: that is, the set of players N3 together with their reported
items. Accordingly,
Pr((i, j) ∈ NM3) ≥
1
4
. (1)
Also, we use DNM3 = ×(i,j)∈NM3Dij and vNM3 = (vij)(i,j)∈NM3 to denote the vector of distributions
and the vector of true values for NM3, respectively. Let IˆNM3 = (N3,M,D
′
N3
) be the unit-demand
instance given to MUD in Step 8. Note that it is exactly I ′ projected to NM3: that is, D′ij = Dij
for any (i, j) ∈ NM3 and D′ij ≡ 0 for any (i, j) /∈ NM3. Accordingly,
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E
v∼D
Rev(MIEUD(I)) = E
NM3
E
vNM3∼DNM3
Rev(MUD(IˆNM3)). (2)
Let IˆCPNM3 = (N
CP
3 ,M
CP ,D′CPN3 ) be the COPIES instance corresponding to IˆNM3 . Following [32],
given any set NM3, the revenue of MUD under the unit-demand Bayesian instance IˆNM3 is a 6-
approximation to the optimal revenue for the COPIES instance. That is, for any NM3,
E
vNM3∼DNM3
Rev(MUD(IˆNM3)) ≥
1
6
E
D′CPN3
OPT (IˆCPNM3). (3)
Combining Inequalities 2 and 3, we have
E
v∼D
Rev(MIEUD(I)) ≥
1
6
E
NM3
E
D′CPN3
OPT (IˆCPNM3). (4)
By Lemma 2,
E
D′CPN3
OPT (IˆCPNM3) ≥ E
DCP
OPT (I ′CP )NM3 ,
thus
E
NM3
E
D′CPN3
OPT (IˆCPNM3) ≥ E
NM3
E
DCP
OPT (I ′CP )NM3 . (5)
Let Pij(OPT (I ′CP )) be the price paid by player i’s copy j under the optimal mechanism for I ′CP .
We can rewrite the right-hand side of Equation 5 as follows.
E
NM3
E
DCP
OPT (I ′CP )NM3 = E
NM3
E
DCP
∑
(i,j)∈NM3
Pij(OPT (I
′CP ))
= E
DCP
E
NM3
∑
(i,j)∈NM3
Pij(OPT (I
′CP ))
= E
DCP
∑
(i,j)∈N×M
Pr((i, j) ∈ NM3) · Pij(OPT (I
′CP )), (6)
where the first equality is by the definition of the projection, the second is because sampling
from DCP is done independently from NM3, and the third is because Pij(OPT (IˆCP )) does not
depend on NM3. We can further lower-bound the last term of Equation 6 as follows:
E
DCP
∑
(i,j)∈N×M
Pr((i, j) ∈ NM3) · Pij(OPT (I
′CP ))
= E
DCP
∑
(i,j)∈N×M :∃i′ s.t. (i′,i)∈Gj
Pr((i, j) ∈ NM3) · Pij(OPT (I
′CP ))
≥
1
4
E
DCP
∑
(i,j)∈N×M :∃i′ s.t. (i′,i)∈Gj
Pij(OPT (I
′CP ))
=
1
4
OPT (I ′CP ) ≥
1
16
OPT (I ′). (7)
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Here the first equality is because Pij(OPT (I ′CP )) = 0 for every (i, j) such that Dij is unknown, the
first inequality is by Equation 1, the second equality is by the definition of revenue, and the second
inequality is because OPT (I ′CP ) ≥ OPT (I
′)
4 by [11].
Combining Equations 4, 5, 6 and 7, we have
Ev∼DRev(MIEUD(I)) ≥
1
6
·
1
16
· OPT (I ′) =
OPT (I ′)
96
,
and Theorem 1 holds.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 3. Mechanism MIEA is 2-DST.
Proof. The structure of a detailed proof for Lemma 3 will be following the two requirements in the
solution concept and similar to that of Lemma 1. Thus we only highlight the key points here.
For each player i, given the distributions and values reported by the other players, the subsets
M1i and M
2
i do not depend on player i’s strategy, neither do the entry fee ei and reserve prices
(p′j)j∈M1i . As far as player i is concerned, the other players’ values are always taken to be b−i, even
if some of their value distributions are not reported. Computing i’s winning sets Mi ∩M1i and
Mi ∩M
2
i is just part of the two mechanisms, Bund and second-price, again with the other players’
values taken to be b−i. Thus, it is dominant for i to report his true values for M1i , following the
truthfulness of Bund; and it is dominant for him to report his true values for M2i , following the
truthfulness of the second-price mechanism.
Moreover, given that all players truthfully report their values, for each player i, reporting his
true knowledge never hurts him, no matter what knowledge the other players report. Indeed, the
winning set Mi only depends on the players’ reported values. Player i’s reported knowledge may
affect how M is partitioned into M1i′ and M
2
i′ for another player i
′, but does not affect the sets M1i
and M2i , or whether he gets some items or not, or the prices he pays. Thus MIEA is 2-DST as
desired.
The adjusted revenue. To lower-bound the expected revenue ofMIEA, we first introduce several
important concepts following [43].
For any single-player Bayesian instance Iˆi = ({i},M,Di) and any non-negative reserve-price
vector βi = (βij)j∈M , a single-player DST Bayesian mechanism is βi-exclusive if it never sells an
item j to i whenever his bid for j is no larger than βij . Denote by RevX(Iˆi, βi) the optimal
βi-exclusive revenue for Iˆi: that is, the superior over the revenue of βi-exclusive mechanisms.
For any single-player DST Bayesian mechanism, its βi-adjusted revenue on Iˆi is its revenue
minus its social welfare generated from player-item pairs (i, j) such that i’s bid for j is no larger
than βij . Denote by RevA(Iˆi, βi) the optimal βi-adjusted revenue for Iˆi: that is, the superior over
the βi-adjusted revenue of all single-player DST Bayesian mechanisms. Note that if a mechanism
is βi-exclusive, then its βi-adjusted revenue is exactly its revenue.
Given a Bayesian instance Iˆ = (N,M,D), for each player i and valuation subprofile v−i ∼ D−i,
let βi(v−i) = (βij(v−i))j∈M be such that βij(v−i) = maxi′ 6=i vi′j for each item j. Note that we
are slightly abusing notations here: each βij is now a function rather than a value. The optimal
β-adjusted revenue for Iˆ is
EDRev
A(Iˆ, β) = Ev∼D
∑
i
RevA(Iˆi, βi(v−i)) =
∑
i
Ev−i∼D−iEvi∼DiRev
A(Iˆi, βi(v−i)).
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When v−i is clear from the context, we may simply write βi and βij .
Because we also consider the projected Bayesian instance I ′ = (N,M,D′), let v′ be v projected
on the knowledge graph G: that is, v′ij = vij if there exists a player i
′ with (i′, i) ∈ Gj , and v′ij = 0
otherwise. As v is distributed according to D, v′ is distributed according to D′. Thus we sometimes
directly sample v′ ∼ D′ rather than sample v first and then map it to v′. Let β′ij(v
′
−i) = maxi′ 6=i v
′
i′j
for each player i and item j. The optimal β′-adjusted revenue for I ′ is defined respectively:
ED′Rev
A(I ′, β′) = Ev′∼D′
∑
i
RevA(I ′i, β
′
i(v
′
−i)) =
∑
i
Ev′
−i∼D
′
−i
Ev′i∼D
′
i
RevA(I ′i, β
′
i(v
′
−i)).
It is important to emphasize that, given v−i and βi(v−i), the optimal βi-exclusive revenue and
the optimal βi-adjusted revenue are well defined for any Bayesian instance for player i, whether it
is Iˆi or I ′i. In particular, we will consider Rev
X(I ′i, βi) and Rev
A(I ′i, βi), which are on the hybrid
of Iˆi and I ′i. The optimal β-adjusted revenue on the hybrid of Iˆ and I
′ are similarly defined:
EDRev
A(I ′, β) =
∑
i
Ev−i∼D−iEv′i∼D
′
i
RevA(I ′i, βi(v−i)).
To highlight that in the inner expectation, player i’s value is v′i even if it is obtained by first sampling
vi ∼ Di and then projecting on G, we may also write it as Evi∼DiRev
A(I ′i, βi; v
′
i) and
EDRev
A(I ′, β) =
∑
i
Ev−i∼D−iEvi∼DiRev
A(I ′i, βi(v−i); v
′
i) = E
v∼D
∑
i
RevA(I ′i, βi(v−i); v
′
i).
Finally, denote by IM the individual Myerson mechanism, which sells each item separately using
Myerson’s mechanism [37]. The revenue of IM under the projected Bayesian instance I ′, denoted
by IM(I ′), is thus the optimal revenue by selling each item separately.
Having defined the notions and notations needed in our proof, we prove Theorem 3 via the
following two technical lemmas. For each lemma, note that on the left-hand side the values are
drawn from the original Bayesian instance, and on the right-hand side the values are drawn from
the projected instance.
Lemma 4. E
v∼D
Rev(MIEA(I)) ≥
1
68 E
v′∼D′
RevA(I ′, β′).
Lemma 5. E
v∼D
Rev(MIEA(I)) ≥
1
2 E
v′∼D′
IM(I ′).
Theorem 3. (restated) Mechanism MIEA for additive auctions is 2-DST and, for any instances
Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G), Ev∼DRev(MIEA(I)) ≥
OPTK(I)
70 .
Proof. By Theorem 8.1 of [43], Ev′∼D′RevA(I ′, β′) + E
v′∼D′
IM(I ′) ≥ OPT (I ′). Combining this
inequality with Lemmas 4 and 5, we have
E
v∼D
Rev(MIEA(I)) ≥
OPT (I ′)
70
=
OPTK(I)
70
,
and Theorem 3 holds.
Below we prove the two lemmas.
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Proof of Lemma 4. For each player i, the set M1i of items for which i’s distributions are reported
and the set M2i of items for which i’s distributions are not reported are uniquely determined by
the knowledge graph G in I . Let I ′
i,M1i
= ({i},M1i ,D
′
i,M1i
) be the single-player Bayesian instance
obtained by projecting I ′ on i and M1i , with D
′
i,M1i
= ×j∈M1i D
′
ij . We have
Ev∼DRev(MIEA(I))
= Ev∼D
∑
i

Rev (Bundi(D′i, vi,M1i , βi(v−i))
)
+
∑
j∈M2i ∩Mi
max
i′ 6=i
vi′j


= Ev∼D
∑
i

Rev (Bundi(D′i,M1i , vi,M1i , βi,M1i )
)
+
∑
j∈M2i ∩Mi
max
i′ 6=i
vi′j

 , (8)
where Bundi is Bund applied to player i in Steps 7 and 8. The first equality is by the construction
of MIEA. The second equality holds because in the execution of Bundi the items in M2i do not
affect anything, as player i’s values for them are constantly 0 in D′i.
By Theorem 6.1 of [43], for any single-player Bayesian instance for a player i and any βi, Bundi is
an 8.5-approximation to the optimal βi-exclusive revenue for this instance. Moreover, by Theorem 1
of [43], the optimal βi-exclusive revenue is an 8-approximation to the optimal βi-adjusted revenue
for the same instance. Accordingly, we have
E
v∼D
∑
i
Rev(Bundi(D
′
i,M1i
, vi,M1i
, βi,M1i
))
=
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
Rev(Bundi(D
′
i,M1i
, vi,M1i
, βi,M1i
))
=
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
Rev(Bundi(D
′
i,M1i
, v′
i,M1i
, βi,M1i ))
=
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
Rev(Bundi(I
′
i,M1i
, βi,M1i ))
≥
1
8.5
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
RevX(I ′
i,M1i
, βi,M1i
)
=
1
8.5
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
RevX(I ′i, βi)
≥
1
8.5× 8
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
RevA(I ′i, βi)
=
1
68
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
RevA(I ′i, βi; v
′
i)
=
1
68
E
v∼D
∑
i
RevA(I ′i, βi; v
′
i) =
1
68
Ev∼DRev
A(I ′, β). (9)
The second equality above is because D′i and Di are the same when only M
1
i is concerned, and
v′ij = vij for all j ∈M
1
i . The first inequality is by the relation between Bundi and Rev
X . The next
equality is because i’s values for items in M2i are always 0 under I
′
i, thus even when these items
are available, a β-exclusive mechanism does not sell them to i anyway. The second inequality is by
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the relation between RevX and the RevA. The next equality is because, as mentioned before, when
sampling vi from Di and then projecting it on G, the resulting v′i is distributed according to D
′
i.
Now we state the key lemma in our analysis, which connects the hybrid adjusted revenue with
that for I ′. Recall that each β′i is defined based on v
′
−i ∼ D
′
−i.
Lemma 6.
Ev∼DRev
A(I ′, β) + Ev∼D
∑
i
∑
j∈M2i ∩Mi
max
i′ 6=i
vi′j ≥ Ev′∼D′Rev
A(I ′, β′).
Before proving Lemma 6, note that combining it with Equations 8 and 9 we have
E
v∼D
Rev(MIEA(I)) ≥
1
68
E
v′∼D′
RevA(I ′, β′). (10)
Thus Lemma 4 holds.
Next we prove Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 6. Arbitrarily fixing a player i and v′−i ∼ D
′
−i, let M
∗ be the single-player DST
Bayesian mechanism with the optimal β′i-adjusted revenue for I
′
i.
6 Accordingly, M∗ maximizes the
following quantity:
E
v′
−i∼D
′
−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
[Rev(M∗(I ′i))−
∑
j:v′ij≤β
′
ij
qijv
′
ij ],
where qij is the probability for i to get item j in M∗ under v′i. By definition,
E
v′∼D′
RevA(I ′i, β
′
i) = E
v′∼D′
[Rev(M∗(I ′i))−
∑
j:v′ij≤β
′
ij
qijv
′
ij ]. (11)
Again because sampling v from D and projecting it on G induces the same distribution for v′ as D′,
we have
E
v′∼D′
[Rev(M∗(I ′i))−
∑
j:v′ij≤β
′
ij
qijv
′
ij] = E
v∼D
[Rev(M∗(I ′i; v
′
i))−
∑
j:v′ij≤β
′
ij
qijv
′
ij ], (12)
where we explicitly include v′i in the input of M
∗ to emphasize the projection.
Arbitrarily fix v−i and let Ui = {j|j ∈M1i , β
′
ij 6= βij}. It is clear that β
′
ij < βij for each j ∈ Ui,
as v′−i ≤ v−i (component-wise). For any vi and the corresponding v
′
i, as v
′
ij = 0 for any j 6∈M
1
i , we
have ∑
j:v′ij≤β
′
ij
qijv
′
ij =
∑
j∈M1i :v
′
ij≤β
′
ij
qijv
′
ij =
∑
j∈M1i \Ui:v
′
ij≤β
′
ij
qijv
′
ij +
∑
j∈Ui:v′ij≤β
′
ij
qijv
′
ij
=
∑
j∈M1i \Ui:v
′
ij≤βij
qijv
′
ij +
∑
j∈Ui:v′ij≤βij
qijv
′
ij −
∑
j∈Ui:β′ij<v
′
ij≤βij
qijv
′
ij
=
∑
j∈M1i :v
′
ij≤βij
qijv
′
ij −
∑
j∈Ui:β′ij<v
′
ij≤βij
qijv
′
ij
=
∑
j:v′ij≤βij
qijv
′
ij −
∑
j∈Ui:β′ij<v
′
ij≤βij
qijv
′
ij. (13)
6If the superior is not achieved by any mechanism, one can take a sequence of mechanisms whose β′i-adjusted
revenue approaches the superior in the limit.
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Combining Equations 11, 12, 13 and taking summation over all players, we have
Ev′∼D′Rev
A(I ′, β′) =
∑
i
E
v′∼D′
RevA(I ′i, β
′
i)
=
∑
i
E
v∼D
[Rev(M∗(I ′i; v
′
i))−
∑
j:v′ij≤β
′
ij
qijv
′
ij ]
=
∑
i
E
v∼D

Rev(M∗(I ′i; v′i))− ∑
j:v′ij≤βij
qijv
′
ij +
∑
j∈Ui:β′ij<v
′
ij≤βij
qijv
′
ij


≤
∑
i
E
v∼D
RevA(I ′i, βi; v
′
i) +
∑
i
E
v∼D
∑
j∈Ui:β′ij<v
′
ij≤βij
qijv
′
ij
=
∑
i
E
v∼D
RevA(I ′i, βi; v
′
i) + E
v∼D
∑
i
∑
j∈Ui:β′ij<vij≤βij
qijvij
≤
∑
i
E
v∼D
RevA(I ′i, βi; v
′
i) + E
v∼D
∑
i
∑
j∈Ui:β′ij<vij≤βij
vij
= Ev∼DRev
A(I ′, β) + E
v∼D
∑
i
∑
j∈Ui:β′ij<vij≤βij
vij . (14)
The first inequality above is because the first two terms in the expectation is exactly the β-adjusted
revenue of mechanism M∗ on I ′i. The following equality holds because v
′
ij = vij for any j ∈ M
1
i .
Finally, the second inequality is because 0 ≤ qij ≤ 1 for any i, j.
Arbitrarily fix a valuation profile v and consider the term
∑
i
∑
j∈Ui:β′ij<vij≤βij
vij at the end of
Equation 14. We show that each item j appears in the summation at most once. Indeed, for each
vij that appears in the summation, j ∈ M1i and Dij is known in I . As vij > β
′
ij , player i has
strictly higher value for j than any other player i′ whose distribution for j is also known. For any
such player i′, β′i′j = vij > vi′j and j is not in the set {j ∈ Ui′ : β
′
i′j < vi′j ≤ βi′j}, which implies
that vi′j does not appear in the summation. Moreover, for any player i′′ 6= i with Di′′j unknown,
j /∈M1i′′j and vi′′j does not appear in the summation either. Therefore item j only appears once in
the summation. Accordingly,∑
i
∑
j∈Ui:β′ij<vij≤βij
vij =
∑
j: ∃! i s.t. j∈Ui, β′ij<vij≤βij
vij . (15)
We now show that ∑
j: ∃! i s.t. j∈Ui, β′ij<vij≤βij
vij ≤
∑
i
∑
j∈M2i ∩Mi
max
i′ 6=i
vi′j , (16)
where the right-hand side is exactly the revenue generated by mechanism MIEA in Step 9 and also
the desired term in the statement of Lemma 6. Indeed, for each vij that appears in the left-hand
side, because vij ≤ βij , player i’s value for j is at most the second highest among all players.
Letting i∗ = argmaxi′ 6=i vi′j with ties broken lexicographically, we have βij = vi∗j and vi∗j is the
highest value for j among all players. Since β′ij < βij , Di∗j is unknown and j ∈ M
2
i∗ . Below we
show j ∈ Mi∗ , which then implies j ∈ M2i∗ ∩Mi∗ and the price paid by i
∗ in Step 9 for item j is
maxi′ 6=i∗ vi′j ≥ vij .
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When the distributions are generic, there are no ties in the players’ values and vi∗j is the unique
maximum value for j, thus j ∈Mi∗ . For arbitrary distributions, problems occur when vij = βij and
i < i∗, which implies j /∈ Mi∗ . To deal with this special case, consider the following tie-breaking
method for the players: while the value βij is still defined to be vi∗j , we denote it by β
+
ij if i
∗ < i and
β−ij if i
∗ > i. When vij = βij , we treat vij as strictly smaller if facing β
+
ij and strictly larger if facing
β−ij . All results proved in [43] and above continue to hold with respect to this tie-breaking method.
Now for any vij that appears in the summation, either we have vij < βij or we have vij = βij and
i∗ < i, thus it is always the case that j ∈Mi∗ .
Accordingly, ∑
j: ∃! i s.t. j∈Ui, β′ij<vij≤βij
vij ≤
∑
j: ∃! i∗ s.t. j∈M2
i∗
∩Mi∗
max
i′ 6=i∗
vi′j =
∑
i
∑
j∈M2i ∩Mi
max
i′ 6=i
vi′j,
and Equation 16 holds. Combining Equations 14, 15 and 16, we have
Ev′∼D′Rev
A(I ′, β′) ≤ Ev∼DRev
A(I ′, β) + E
v∼D
∑
i
∑
j∈M2i ∩Mi
max
i′ 6=i
vi′j ,
and Lemma 6 holds.
We finish the whole analysis by proving Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 5. Denote by M1LA the individual 1-lookahead mechanism, which sells each item
separately using the 1-lookahead mechanism [40] and is a 2-approximation to Myerson’s mechanism
for each item. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4, the expected revenue generated by Bundi in Steps 7
and 8 is
E
v∼D
∑
i
Rev(Bundi(D
′
i, vi,M1i
, βi(v−i)))
=
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
Rev(Bundi(Di,M1i , vi,M1i , βi,M1i ))
≥
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
Rev(M1LA(Di,M1i , vi,M1i , βi,M1i ))
=
∑
i
E
v∼D
Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,M1i , βi,M1i )). (17)
The first equality above is again because items in M2i does not affect Bundi given that player i’s
values for them are constantly 0 according to D′i, and D
′
i and Di coincide when only items in M
1
i
are concerned. The inequality holds because given Di,M1i and βi,M1i , mechanism Bundi chooses
between optimally selling to i the items as a bundle (i.e., ei > 0) and optimally selling to i each
item separately (i.e., ei = 0), whichever generates higher expected revenue over vi,M1i ∼ Di,M1i ;
while M1LA is a particular mechanism that sells each item j ∈ M1i to i separately based on Dij
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and βij . Accordingly, letting Dj = ×(Dij)i∈N and vj ∼ Dj for each item j, we have
Ev∼DRev(MIEA(I))
= Ev∼D
∑
i

Rev (Bundi(D′i, vi,M1i , βi(v−i))
)
+
∑
j∈M2i ∩Mi
max
i′ 6=i
vi′j


≥
∑
i
E
v∼D

Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,M1i , βi,M1i )) + ∑
j∈M2i ∩Mi
max
i′ 6=i
vi′j


=
∑
j∈M
∑
i
E
vj∼Dj
(
Ij∈M1i
·Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,j, βij)) + Ij∈M2i ∩Mi ·maxi′ 6=i
vi′j
)
. (18)
Arbitrarily fixing an item j, we show that
∑
i
E
vj∼Dj
(
Ij∈M1i
·Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,j, βij)) + Ij∈M2i ∩Mi ·maxi′ 6=i
vi′j
)
≥
∑
i
E
v′j∼D
′
j
Ij∈M1i
·Rev(M1LA(I
′
i,j, β
′
ij)). (19)
To do so, by definition, if j ∈M1i for a player i then in the Bayesian instance I
′
i,j and given the
reserve price β′ij , the 1-lookahead mechanism tries to sell j to i at price
7
r′ij = argmax
x
x Pr
v′ij∼D
′
ij
(v′ij ≥ x|v
′
ij ≥ β
′
ij).
Thus ∑
i
E
v′j∼D
′
j
Ij∈M1i
· Rev(M1LA(I
′
i,j, β
′
ij))
=
∑
i
E
v′
−i,j∼D
′
−i,j
E
v′ij∼D
′
ij
Ij∈M1i
· Iv′ij≥r′ij · r
′
ij
=
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Iv′ij≥r′ij(v′−i,j) · r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j), (20)
where the second equality is again by sampling vj from Dj and projecting on G to get v′j . We write
r′ij as r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j) to highlight this fact. Note that given v
′
−i,j, r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j) depends on the distribution
D′ij but not on any concrete v
′
ij . Also note that r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j) ≥ β
′
ij . Next, we divide the last term in
Equation 20 into two parts, depending on whether r′ij(v
′
−i,j) < βij or not. That is,∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Iv′ij≥r′ij(v′−i,j ) · r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j)
=
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Iv′ij≥r′ij(v′−i,j ) ·
(
Ir′ij(v
′
−i,j)<βij
+ Ir′ij(v′−i,j )≥βij
)
· r′ij(v
′
−i,j).
(21)
7Strictly speaking, under the Bayesian instance I′, the individual 1-lookahead mechanism for item j works as
follows. Given v′j ∼ Dj , it finds the highest bidder i for j with ties broken lexicographically, as well as the second
highest bid which is exactly β′ij . It then tries to sell j to i at price r
′
ij . For generic distributions, there are no ties in
v′j and the mechanism can be run on each instance I
′
ij and β
′
ij separately, without ever selling j to more than one
players. For arbitrary distributions, this can be done by introducing proper tie-breaking rules.
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For the r′ij(v
′
−i,j) < βij part in Equation 21, we have
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Iv′ij≥r′ij(v′−i,j ) · Ir′ij(v′−i,j )<βij · r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j)
=
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
·
(
Iv′ij≥βij>r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j)
+ Iβij>v′ij≥r′ij(v′−i,j )
)
· r′ij(v
′
−i,j)
=
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
·
(
Ivij≥βij>r′ij(v
′
−i,j)
+ Iβij>vij≥r′ij(v′−i,j )
)
· r′ij(v
′
−i,j)
≤
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
·
(
Ivij≥βij>r′ij(v
′
−i,j)
· βij + Iβij>vij≥r′ij(v′−i,j ) · vij
)
=
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Iβij>r′ij(v′−i,j) · Ivij≥βij · βij
+
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Iβij>vij≥r′ij(v′−i,j) · vij. (22)
The first equality above is by distinguishing whether βij ≤ v′ij or not. The second equality is because
vij = v
′
ij whenever j ∈M
1
i . The inequality is because r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j) < βij following the indicator in the
first term and r′ij(v
′
−i,j) ≤ vij following the indicator in the second term. Finally, the last equality
is because Ivij≥βij>r′ij(v′−i,j) = Iβij>r′ij(v′−i,j ) · Ivij≥βij in the first term.
For the first term in Equation 22, because the indicators Ij∈M1i and Iβij>r′ij(v′−i,j ) does not depend
on vij, we have ∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Iβij>r′ij(v′−i,j) · Ivij≥βij · βij
=
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
Ij∈M1i
· Iβij>r′ij(v′−i,j)
(
E
vij∼Dij
Ivij≥βij · βij
)
≤
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
Ij∈M1i
· Iβij>r′ij(v′−i,j)
(
E
vij∼Dij
Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,j, βij))
)
,
where the inequality is because on the Bayesian instance Iˆi,j and given the reserve price βij , mech-
anism M1LA chooses the optimal price rij to maximize the expected revenue and is no worse than
simply setting rij = βij .
For the second term in Equation 22, for any valuation profile v, if there exists a player i is such
that the two indicators both equal to 1, then we have βij > vij ≥ β′ij , because βij > vij ≥ r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j)
and r′ij(v
′
−i,j) ≥ β
′
ij . Thus the (lexicographically first) highest bidder i
∗ for j in vj has his distribution
unknown, and j ∈M2i∗ ∩Mi∗ ; and player i is the (lexicographically first) highest bidder for j in v
′
j ,
which is unique. Accordingly,∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Iβij>vij≥r′ij(v′−i,j ) · vij
= E
vj∼Dj
∑
i
Ij∈M1i
· Iβij>vij≥r′ij(v′−i,j) · vij
≤ E
vj∼Dj
Ij∈M2
i∗
∩Mi∗
· max
i:j∈M1i
vij ≤ E
vj∼Dj
Ij∈M2
i∗
∩Mi∗
·max
i′ 6=i∗
vi′j
= E
vj∼Dj
∑
i
Ij∈M2i ∩Mi
·max
i′ 6=i
vi′j ,
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where the last equality is because i∗ is the unique player such that the indicator is 1.
Combining the above two equations with Equation 22, for the r′ij(v
′
−i,j) < βij part in Equation 21
we have ∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Iv′ij≥r′ij(v′−i,j ) · Ir′ij(v′−i,j )<βij · r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j)
≤
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
Ij∈M1i
· Iβij>r′ij(v′−i,j)
(
E
vij∼Dij
Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,j, βij))
)
+ E
vj∼Dj
∑
i
Ij∈M2i ∩Mi
·max
i′ 6=i
vi′j
=
∑
i
E
vj∼Dj
(
Ij∈M1i
· Iβij>r′ij(v′−i,j) · Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,j, βij)) + Ij∈M2i ∩Mi ·maxi′ 6=i
vi′j
)
.
For the r′ij(v
′
−i,j) ≥ βij part in Equation 21, we immediately have r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j) = rij(v−i,j) when
the indicators are 1, because D′ij = Dij and v
′
ij = vij whenever j ∈ M
1
i , and rij(v−i,j) maximizes
the expected revenue over Dij conditional on vij ≥ βij . Thus
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Iv′ij≥r′ij(v′−i,j) · Ir′ij(v′−i,j)≥βij · r
′
ij(v
′
−i,j)
=
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
E
vij∼Dij
Ij∈M1i
· Ivij≥rij(v−i,j) · Ir′ij(v′−i,j)≥βij · rij(v−i,j)
=
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
Ij∈M1i
· Ir′ij(v′−i,j )≥βij
(
E
vij∼Dij
Ivij≥rij(v−i,j ) · rij(v−i,j)
)
=
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
Ij∈M1i
· Ir′ij(v′−i,j )≥βij
(
E
vij∼Dij
Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,j, βij))
)
.
Combining the above two equations with Equation 21 and then Equation 20, we have
∑
i
E
v′j∼D
′
j
Ij∈M1i
·Rev(M1LA(I
′
i,j, β
′
ij))
≤
∑
i
E
vj∼Dj
(
Ij∈M1i
· Iβij>r′ij(v′−i,j ) ·Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,j, βij)) + Ij∈M2i ∩Mi ·maxi′ 6=i
vi′j
)
+
∑
i
E
v−i,j∼D−i,j
Ij∈M1i
· Ir′ij(v′−i,j )≥βij
(
E
vij∼Dij
Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,j, βij))
)
=
∑
i
E
vj∼Dj
(
Ij∈M1i
·Rev(M1LA(Iˆi,j, βij)) + Ij∈M2i ∩Mi ·maxi′ 6=i
vi′j
)
,
and Equation 19 holds.
Taking summation over all items j on both sides of Equation 19 and combining with Equation 18,
we have
Ev∼DRev(MIEA(I)) ≥
∑
j∈M
∑
i
E
v′j∼D
′
j
Ij∈M1i
·Rev(M1LA(I
′
i,j, β
′
ij))
= E
v′∼D′
∑
i
∑
j∈M1i
Rev(M1LA(I
′
i,j, β
′
ij)) = E
v′∼D′
Rev(M1LA(I
′)) ≥
1
2
E
v′∼D′
IM(I ′),
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where the inequality is because M1LA is a 2-approximation to Myerson’s mechanism for each
item [40]. Thus Lemma 5 holds.
B Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. (restated) ∀k ∈ [n− 1], any unit-demand auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I =
(N,M,D, G) where G is k-informed, mechanism M′IEUD is 2-DST and Ev∼DRev(M
′
IEUD(I)) ≥
τk
24 ·OPT (Iˆ).
Proof. The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 1, thus most details are omitted. Below
we only show that under the players’ truthful strategies, the probability for each distribution Dij
to be reported in mechanism M′IEUD is at least τk. Indeed, for any player i and item j,
Pr(Dij is reported in the mechanism) = Pr(i ∈ N2) Pr(∃i
′ ∈ N1, (i, i
′) ∈ Gj | i ∈ N2)
≥ (1− q)(1− (1− q)k),
where the inequality is because Dij is known by at least k players other than i, and the players are
partitioned independently. Taking derivatives of the last term, we have that it is maximized when
q = 1− (k + 1)−
1
k as in the mechanism, in which case
Pr(Dij is reported in the mechanism) ≥
1
(k + 1)
1
k
·
k
k + 1
= τk.
Combined with the proof of Theorem 1, Theorem 4 holds.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5
The Information Elicitation Individual Myerson Mechanism. We start by introducing the
information elicitation individual Myerson mechanismMIEIM , which runs the following mechanism
MIEIM,j for each item j separately. Mechanism MIEIM,j is similar to MIEUD and M′IEUD, thus
we have omitted many details in the analysis.
Mechanism 4 MIEIM,j
1: Each player i reports a value bij and a knowledge Kij = (Dii′j)i′ 6=i.
2: Randomly partition the players into two sets, N1 and N2, where each player is independently
put in N1 with probability q = 1− (k + 1)−
1
k and N2 with probability 1− q.
3: Let N3 be the set of players in N2 whose distributions are reported by some players in N1, and
D′N3,j be the vector of reported distributions.
4: Run Myerson’s mechanism on the single-good Bayesian instance IˆN3,j = (N3, {j},D
′
N3 ,j
) with
the values being (bij)i∈N3 ; and use the resulting allocation and prices to sell to players in N3.
For each item j, let vj = (vij)i∈N , Dj = (Dij)i∈N , Iˆj = (N, {j},Dj ) be the corresponding single-
good Bayesian instance, and Ij = (N, {j},Dj , Gj) be the corresponding single-good information
elicitation instance. Lemma 7 below is similar to Lemma 1 and we provide its statement only.
Lemma 7. For any additive auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G), mechanism
MIEIM,j is 2-DST for Ij for each j ∈M , and mechanism MIEIM is 2-DST for I.
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Next, we consider the expected revenue of MIEIM .
Lemma 8. Ev∼DRev(MIEIM (I)) ≥ τkEv∼DRev(IM(Iˆ)).
Proof. By definition,
Ev∼DRev(MIEIM (I)) =
∑
j∈M
Evj∼DjRev(MIEIM,j(Ij))
and
Ev∼DRev(IM(Iˆ)) =
∑
j∈M
OPT (Iˆj).
Accordingly, it suffices to show that for each item j,
Evj∼DjRev(MIEIM,j(Ij)) ≥ τkOPT (Iˆj).
Using ideas and notations similar to those in the proofs of Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we have
Evj∼DjRev(MIEIM,j(Ij))
= E
N3
E
vN3,j∼DN3,j
OPT (IˆN3,j) ≥ E
N3
E
vj∼Dj
OPT (Iˆj)N3
= E
N3
E
vj∼Dj
∑
i∈N3
Pi(OPT (Iˆj)) = E
vj∼Dj
E
N3
∑
i∈N3
Pi(OPT (Iˆj))
= E
vj∼Dj
∑
i
Pr(i ∈ N3) · Pi(OPT (Iˆj)) ≥ τk E
vj∼Dj
∑
i
Pi(OPT (Iˆj))
= τkOPT (Iˆj),
as desired. Thus Lemma 8 holds.
The Information Elicitation Individual 1-Lookahead Mechanism. Next, we introduce
the information elicitation 1-lookahead mechanism MIE1LA, which runs the following mechanism
MIE1LA,j for each item j separately. We will show that the revenue of MIE1LA matches that of
mechanism M1LA for any k ≥ 1.
Mechanism 5 MIE1LA,j
1: Each player i reports a value bij and a knowledge Kij = (Dii′j)i′ 6=i.
2: Set i∗ = argmaxi bij and psecond = maxi 6=i∗ bij.
3: If i∗’s distribution is not reported, sell item j to him at price psecond and halt here.
4: Otherwise, let D′i∗j be the reported distribution for i
∗ (if there are many reported distributions
for him, take the one by the lexicographically first reporter).
5: Let pi∗ = max
p
Pr
vi∗j∼D
′
i∗j
(vi∗j ≥ p | vi∗j ≥ psecond) · p. If bi∗j ≥ pi∗ then sell item j to i∗ at
price pi∗ ; otherwise the item is unsold.
Note that MIE1LA,j does not partition the players into two groups. Also, it is not exactly
using the 1-lookahead mechanism as a blackbox, because it has to handle boundary cases where the
players’ distributions are not all reported. When the players all tell the truth, all true distributions
will indeed be reported. However, for the mechanism to be well defined, it has to know what to
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do in all possible cases. Moreover, running the 1-lookahead mechanism on the set of players whose
distributions are reported is not 2-DST: for example, if the player with the second highest value
is the only one who knows the distribution for the player with the highest value, then he may
choose not to report his knowledge about the latter, so that he himself has the highest value in the
1-Lookahead mechanism and gets a high utility. That is why the mechanism only tries to sell to
the player with the highest value. We have the following two lemmas.
Lemma 9. For any additive auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G), mechanism
MIE1LA,j is 2-DST for each Ij, and mechanism MIE1LA is 2-DST for I.
Proof. As in mechanism MIEA, in each mechanism MIE1LA,j, the fact that it is dominant for each
player i to report his true value no matter what knowledge the players report follows from the
truthfulness of the second-price mechanism and that of the 1-lookahead mechanism. Given that all
players report their true values, a player i’s reported knowledge does not affect whether he is i∗ or
not. It may affect the other players’ utilities, but not his own. Thus reporting his true knowledge
never hurts him, and mechanism MIE1LA,j is 2-DST for Ij.
Since the players have additive valuations and MIE1LA runs each mechanism MIE1LA,j sepa-
rately for item j, we have that MIE1LA is 2-DST for I and Lemma 9 holds.
Lemma 10. Ev∼DRev(MIE1LA(I)) = Ev∼DRev(M1LA(Iˆ)) ≥
1
2Ev∼DRev(IM(Iˆ)).
Proof. When the players report their true values and true knowledge, the outcome of eachMIE1LA,j
on the information elicitation instance Ij is the same as that of mechanism M1LA on the Bayesian
instance Iˆj, because the distribution for i∗ is reported. Accordingly,
Ev∼DRev(MIE1LA(I)) =
∑
j∈M
Evj∼DjRev(MIE1LA,j(Ij)) = Ev∼DRev(M1LA(Iˆ))
≥
∑
j∈M
1
2
OPT (Iˆj) =
1
2
Ev∼DRev(IM(Iˆ)),
where the inequality is because the 1-lookahead mechanism is a 2-approximation to the optimal
Bayesian mechanism for each item j [40]. Thus Lemma 10 holds.
Note that the approximation ratio of MIE1LA does not depend on the specific value of k, as
long as k ≥ 1.
The Information Elicitation BV CG Mechanism. The mechanism MIEBV CG is defined in
Mechanism 6. It is similar toMIEA and approximates mechanism BV CG in information elicitation
settings. If a player i’s value distributions are not all reported, MIEBV CG throws i away and
leaves his winning set unsold. This simplifies the instructions compared to MIEA and still ensures
truthfulness. Doing so would seriously damage the revenue if the knowledge graphs can be totally
arbitrary. However, when everything is known by somebody and when the players report their true
knowledge, no player is actually thrown away. We have the following two lemmas.
Lemma 11. Mechanism MIEBV CG is 2-DST.
Proof. Arbitrarily fix a player i, a strategy subprofile of the other players, and a knowledge of i.
If not all m distributions of i’s values are reported by the others, then i gets nothing and pays
nothing, so it does not matter what valuation he reports about himself. Otherwise, MIEBV CG
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Mechanism 6 MIEBV CG
1: Each player i reports a valuation bi = (bij)j∈M and a knowledge Ki = (Dii′j)i′ 6=i,j∈M .
2: For each item j, set i∗(j) = argmaxi bij (ties broken lexicographically) and pj = maxi 6=i∗ bij .
3: for each player i do
4: Let Mi = {j | i∗(j) = i} be player i’s winning set.
5: If not all m distributions of i’s values are reported, i gets no item and items in Mi are unsold.
6: Otherwise, let D′i be the vector of reported distributions for i’s values (if there are more than
one reporters for an item, take the lexicographically first).
7: Compute the entry fee ei(D′i, b−i) using BV CG. Note that different from mechanism Bund,
BV CG does not compute extra reserve prices for i.
8: Sell Mi to player i according to BV CG. That is, if
∑
j∈Mi
bij ≥ ei(D
′
i, b−i) +
∑
j∈Mi
pj then
i gets Mi with price ei(D′i, b−i) +
∑
j∈Mi
pj; otherwise i gets no item and the items in Mi are
unsold.
9: end for
sells to player i in the same way as BV CG: using the other players’ highest reported value as the
reserve price for each item, either player i gets the whole set of items for which his value passes
the reserve price (i.e., his winning set), or he gets nothing and those items are unsold to anybody.
Following [43], it is dominant for i to report his true values given any entry fee that does not depend
on his reported values, so is it when the entry fee is computed based on D′i and b−i.
Moreover, a player i’s reported knowledge Ki about others affects neither Mi nor ei, nor the
reserve prices for him. Thus reporting his true knowledge never hurts him and Lemma 11 holds.
Lemma 12. E
v∼D
Rev(MIEBV CG(I)) = E
v∼D
Rev(BV CG(Iˆ)).
Proof. Since MIEBV CG retrieves the whole distribution D from the players, its outcome is exactly
the same as that of BV CG under the Bayesian instance Iˆ.
Remark. Similar to MIE1LA, the revenue of MIEBV CG does not depend on the specific value
of k, as long as k ≥ 1. Indeed, notice the special structures of the two Bayesian mechanisms M1LA
and BV CG: the winning set of a player i solely depends on the players’ values; the distribution Di
is only used to compute better reserve prices or entry fee to increase revenue; and the distribution
D−i is irrelevant to i. Therefore, in the information elicitation setting we can allow a player to be
both a reporter about the others’ distributions and a potential buyer of some items. In some other
mechanisms such as Myerson’s mechanism, all players’ distributions are used both to choose the
potential winner and to set his price, thus in the information elicitation setting we must separate
the knowledge reporters and the potential winners.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. (restated) For any k ∈ [n − 1], any additive auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and
I = (N,M,D, G) where G is k-informed, the mechanism M′IEA is 2-DST and
Ev∼DRev(M
′
IEA(I)) ≥ max{
1
11
,
τk
6 + 2τk
} · OPT (Iˆ).
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Proof. Recall that mechanism M′IEA is defined as follows: when k ≤ 7, it runs MIEBV CG with
probability 211 and MIE1LA with probability
9
11 ; when k > 7, it runs MIEBV CG with probability
τk
3+τk
and MIEIM with probability 33+τk .
The mechanism M′IEA is clearly 2-DST, since all the sub-mechanisms are 2-DST, and which
mechanism is chosen does not depend on the players’ strategies.
When k ≤ 7, we have τk6+2τk <
1
11 . By Lemmas 10 and 12,
E
v∼D
Rev(M′IEA(I)) =
2
11
E
v∼D
Rev(MIEBV CG(I)) +
9
11
E
v∼D
Rev(MIE1LA(I))
≥
2
11
E
v∼D
Rev(BV CG(Iˆ)) +
3
11
E
v∼D
Rev(IM(Iˆ)) +
3
11
E
v∼D
Rev(M1LA(Iˆ)). (23)
When k > 7, we have τk6+2τk >
1
11 . By Lemmas 8 and 12,
E
v∼D
Rev(M′IEA(I)) =
τk
3 + τk
E
v∼D
Rev(MIEBV CG(I)) +
3
3 + τk
E
v∼D
Rev(MIEIM (I))
≥
τk
3 + τk
E
v∼D
Rev(BV CG(Iˆ)) +
3τk
3 + τk
E
v∼D
Rev(IM(Iˆ)). (24)
By [11],
OPT (Iˆ) ≤ 2 E
v∼D
Rev(BV CG(Iˆ)) + 3 E
v∼D
Rev(IM(Iˆ)) + 3 E
v∼D
Rev(M1LA(Iˆ))
≤ 2 E
v∼D
Rev(BV CG(Iˆ)) + 6 E
v∼D
Rev(IM(Iˆ)).
Combined the first inequality with Inequality 23 and the second with Inequality 24, we have
E
v∼D
Rev(M′IEA(I)) ≥ max
{
1
11
,
τk
6 + 2τk
}
·OPT (Iˆ),
and Theorem 5 holds.
B.3 An Illustration of Mechanism MIEM
The sets of players involved in the first round of mechanism MIEM are illustrated in Figure 2.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 6
Lemma 13. MIEM is 2-DST.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 1, the proof takes two steps.
Claim 3. For any player i, true value vi, value bi, knowledge Ki, and strategy subprofile s−i =
(bj ,Kj)j 6=i of the other players, EMIEMui((vi,Ki), s−i) ≥ EMIEMui((bi,Ki), s−i), where the expec-
tation is taken over the mechanism’s random coins.
Proof. First, conditional on a = i, player i does not get the item and his reported value is not used
by the mechanism. Thus ui((vi,Ki), s−i) = ui((bi,Ki), s−i) = 0 in this case.
Second, we compare the two utilities conditional on a 6= i. Notice that when a 6= i, whether or
not player i’s distribution is reported—that is, whether or not D′i is defined— only depends on s−i.
Thus D′i is defined under (vi,Ki) if and only if it is defined under (bi,Ki).
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Figure 2: The sets of players involved in the first round of Mechanism MIEM . The edges in the
figure correspond to distributions reported by the players. In each round, the mechanism keeps in
S the player with the highest virtual value so far, drops all the other players from S, and adds the
players whose distributions are reported for the first time by the dropped ones.
If D′i is not defined, then i ∈ N
′ at the end of the mechanism, he does not get the item, and his
reported value is not used. Therefore ui((vi,Ki), s−i) = ui((bi,Ki), s−i) = 0 again.
If D′i is defined, then it is defined in the same round of the mechanism under both (vi,Ki) and
(bi,Ki), which we refer to as round r. Also, D′i is the same in both cases and the mechanism’s
execution is the same till this round. Notice that
(1) φi(·;D′i) is monotone in its input;
(2) i gets the item if and only if i = i∗ in all rounds ℓ with ℓ ≥ r and his virtual value is at least 0;
and
(3) when i gets the item, Ki is never used by the mechanism and thus does not affect the execution
of any round ℓ with ℓ ≥ r.
Accordingly, the mechanism is monotone in player i’s reported value: if i gets the item by reporting
some value, then he still gets it by reporting a higher value. Moreover, when i gets the item, his
price in Step 13 is the threshold payment. Following standard characterizations of single-parameter
DST mechanisms, it is the best for player i to report his true value vi. That is, ui((vi,Ki), s−i) ≥
ui((bi,Ki), s−i) when D′i is defined.
Combining the above cases together, we have EMIEMui((vi,Ki), s−i) ≥ EMIEMui((bi,Ki), s−i)
and Claim 3 holds.
Claim 4. For any player i, true value vi, true knowledge Ki, knowledge K
′
i, and knowledge subprofile
K ′−i(v−i) = (K
′
j(vj))j 6=i of the other players, where each K
′
j(vj) is a function of player j’s true
value vj, Ev−i∼D−iui((vi,Ki), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))) ≥ Ev−i∼D−iui((vi,K
′
i), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))).
Proof. Similar to Claim 3, conditional on a = i, player i does not get the item no matter what
knowledge he reports. Thus
Ev−i∼D−i [ui((vi,Ki), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))) | a = i] = Ev−i∼D−i [ui((vi,K
′
i), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))) | a = i] = 0.
Next, we compare the two utilities conditional on a 6= i. Again similar to Claim 3, D′i is the
same under both strategies of i, and the mechanism’s execution is also the same till the round r
where D′i is defined (or till the end if D
′
i is not defined). There are three cases:
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• If D′i is not defined, then neither Ki nor K
′
i is used by the mechanism, and i has utility 0
under both strategies.
• If D′i is defined and i = i
∗ from round r to the end of the mechanism, then again Ki and K ′i
are not used. Thus i has the same utility (maybe non-zero) under both strategies.
• If D′i is defined and i 6= i
∗ starting from some round r′ ≥ r, then i does not get the item under
either strategy, thus his utility is 0 under both of them.
In sum, Ev−i∼D−iui((vi,Ki), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))) = Ev−i∼D−iui((vi,K
′
i), (v−i,K
′
−i(v−i))) and reporting
his true knowledge does not hurt player i.
Lemma 13 follows directly from Claims 3 and 4.
Theorem 6. (restated) For any single-good auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G)
where G is 2-connected, MIEM is 2-DST and Ev∼DRev(MIEM (I)) ≥ (1−
1
n
)OPT (Iˆ).
Proof. Following Lemma 13, it remains to show Ev∼DRev(MIEM (I)) ≥ (1− 1n)OPT (Iˆ) under the
players’ truthful strategies. The key is to explore the structure of the knowledge graph to make sure
that the player with the highest virtual value is found by the mechanism with high probability.
More specifically, arbitrarily fix the player a chosen by the mechanism. Notice that throughout
the mechanism, N ′ is the set of players i ∈ N \ {a} such that D′i is not defined. We show that
N ′ = ∅ at the end of the mechanism. Indeed, since G is 2-connected, the out-degree of a in G is
at least 2: otherwise, either a cannot reach any other node in G, or this becomes the case after
removing the unique node j with (a, j) ∈ G, contradicting 2-connectedness. Since a reports his true
knowledge Ka, we have |S| ≥ 2 in Step 3 and the mechanism does not stop there. Moreover, at the
beginning of each round, we have |S| ≥ 2 and thus S \ {i∗} 6= ∅: otherwise S′ = ∅ in the previous
round, and the mechanism would not have reached this round.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction that the mechanism finally reaches a round r where N ′ 6= ∅
at the beginning but S′ = ∅ in Step 6. Since all players report their true knowledge, by the definition
of S′ we have that, in graph G, all neighbors of S \ {i∗} are in N \N ′. Furthermore, for any player
i ∈ (N \N ′) \ S, all neighbors of i are also in N \N ′: indeed, i has been moved from N ′ to S and
then dropped from S (except player a, whose neighbors are in N \ N ′ by definition); and when i
is dropped from S, all his neighbors in N ′ are moved to S. Accordingly, all the edges going from
N \N ′ to N ′ are from player i∗, and G becomes disconnected after removing i∗, again contradicting
2-connectedness. Thus S′ 6= ∅ in all rounds and N ′ = ∅ in the end, as we wanted to show.
Because all players report their true values and true knowledge, we have D′−a = D−a and
φi(vi;D
′
i) = φi(vi;Di) for all i 6= a. Letting Iˆa = (N \ {a},M,D−a), we claim
Ev∼D[Rev(MIEM (I))|a] = OPT (Iˆa). (25)
To see why this is true, note that by construction, in each round the mechanism keeps the player
with the highest virtual value in S. Thus, the final player i∗ has the highest virtual value in N \{a},
and φsecond is the second highest virtual value in N \ {a}. Accordingly, the outcome of Step 13 is
the same as that of Myerson’s mechanism on Iˆa, so is the revenue. Therefore Equation 25 holds.
Finally, it remains to show that, by throwing away a random player a, the mechanism does
not lose much revenue. For each player i, letting Pi(OPT (Iˆ)) be the expected price paid by i in
Myerson’s mechanism under Iˆ, we have OPT (Iˆ) =
∑
i∈N Pi(OPT (Iˆ)). Similar to the proof of
Lemma 2, consider the following Bayesian mechanism M′ on Iˆa: it runs Myerson’s mechanism on Iˆ
and then projects the outcome to players N \ {a}. It is easy to see that M′ is DST, thus it cannot
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generate more revenue than OPT (Iˆa). As the expected revenue of M′ is
∑
i 6=a Pi(OPT (Iˆ)), we
have
OPT (Iˆa) ≥ ED−aRev(M
′(Iˆa)) =
∑
i 6=a
Pi(OPT (Iˆ)). (26)
Combining Equations 25 and 26, we have
Ev∼DRev(MIEM (I)) =
∑
a∈N
1
n
Ev∼D[Rev(MIEM (I))|a] =
∑
a∈N
1
n
(
OPT (Iˆa)
)
≥
∑
a∈N
1
n

∑
i 6=a
Pi(OPT (Iˆ))

 =
(∑
i∈N
n− 1
n
Pi(OPT (Iˆ))
)
= (1−
1
n
)OPT (Iˆ),
and Theorem 6 holds.
C Using Scoring Rules to Buy Knowledge from Players
In this section we use proper scoring rules to reward the players for their knowledge, so that it is
strictly better for them to report truthfully. More precisely, a scoring rule is a function f that takes
as inputs a distribution D′ over a state space Ω and a random sample ω from an underlying true
distribution D over Ω, and outputs a real number. Scoring rule f is proper if
Eω∼Df(D, ω) ≥ Eω∼Df(D
′, ω)
for any D and D′, and strictly proper if the inequality is strict for any D′ 6= D. Moreover, f is bounded
if there exist constants c1, c2 such that c1 ≤ f(D′, ω) ≤ c2 for any D′ and ω. Our mechanisms can
use any strictly proper scoring rules that are bounded. For concreteness, we use Brier’s scoring
rule [9]:
BSR(D′, ω) = 2− (
∑
s∈Ω
(δω,s −D
′(s))2) = 2D′(ω)− ||D′||22 + 1,
where D′(s) is the probability of s according to D′, and δω,s is the indicator for ω = s. Note that
BSR(D′, ω) ∈ [0, 2] for any D′ and ω.8
In all our mechanisms, when player i reports Dii′j 6= ⊥ for player i
′ and item j, the seller rewards i
based on BSR(Dii′j, bi′j). If there are more than one reporters for the same distribution, the seller
can either reward all of them or randomly choose one. We can scale the reward for each distribution
so that the total reward given to the players is at most some constant ǫ, which is an ǫ additive loss
to the revenue. For example, in Mechanism MIEUD, the seller could reward each player i with
rii′j =
ǫ
2mn2
BSR(Dii′j , bi′j)
for reporting the value distribution of player i′ on item j.
Although scoring rules help breaking utility-ties, they cause another problem: a player who does
not know a distribution may report something he made up, just to receive a reward. Therefore we
start by considering our mechanisms under the no-bluff assumption: that is, a player will not report
anything about a distribution that he does not know. More precisely, a player i in an information
elicitation auction is no-bluff if, for any knowledge graph Gj and player i′ with (i, i′) /∈ Gj , and
for any strategy (bi,Ki) of i, i reports ⊥ for the corresponding distribution of i′. Note that for a
8The original version of BSR is bounded by −1 and 1, and we have shifted it up by 2.
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player i′ with (i, i′) ∈ Gj , i may report any distribution about i′, including ⊥. In some sense, the
no-bluff assumption is the analogy of the no-overbidding assumption adopted in budget-constrained
auctions: a player will not bid higher than his true value or budget, even if doing so may not lead
to a price higher than the latter.
For all our mechanisms, it is easy to see that the reward will only affect the players’ incentives
for reporting their knowledge, not their incentives for reporting their values. Accordingly, it is still
dominant for the players to report their true values, no matter what knowledge they report. Given
that the players all report their true values, the reported values are distributed according to the
prior. Thus reporting his true knowledge is now strictly better than lying for a player, because it
maximizes his reward. Rather than restating all our previous theorems, we summarize them in the
theorem below.
Theorem 7. Under the no-bluff assumption, for any information elicitation mechanism in previous
sections, the revised mechanism with proper scoring rules is 2-DST, and reporting his true knowledge
is strictly better than lying for each player i. Moreover, the mechanism’s revenue is the same as
before with an ǫ additive loss.
Next, we show how to remove the no-bluff assumption when everything is known. Without this
assumption, player i may report a distribution for another player i′’s value for an item j, even if
(i, i′) /∈ Gj . However, if there exists a third player iˆ who knows i′’s distribution Di′j, and if player i
is also rewarded for player iˆ’s report, then intuitively player i would have no incentive to bluff
about i′. That is, not only a player is paid for reporting the distributions he knows, but he is also
paid for keeping quiet about the distributions he does not know and letting the experts speak. Surely
reporting Di′j maximizes player i’s expected reward, but he does not have the information to decide
what Di′j is.9 Therefore, as long as reporting “⊥” gives player i the same utility as the unknown
strategy of reporting Di′j, and as long as reporting any distribution other than Di′j gives him a
strictly smaller utility, player i will report “⊥” about Di′j .
Taking mechanism M′IEUD in Section 4 as an example, the players are rewarded as follows:
• For each player i′ and item j, let Ri′j be the set of players who did not report “⊥” about the
value of i′ for j. Randomly select a player iˆ from Ri′j and let ri′j = BSR(Diˆi′j , bi′j). Reward
every player i 6= i′ using ri′j, properly scaled.
Note that the reward ri′j is given to player i even if he has reported Dii′j = ⊥.
It is easy to see that, for any k-informed information elicitation instance with k ≥ 1, if all players
except i report their true values and true knowledge, then player i’s best strategy is to tell the truth
about his own. Indeed, reporting his true values is still dominant no matter what knowledge the
players’ report. Moreover, for each player i′ and item j, there are two ways for player i to maximize
the reward ri′j he receives: (1) reporting Dii′j = ⊥, so that iˆ is chosen with probability 1 from the
set of players who actually know Di′j ; or (2) successfully guessing Di′j and reporting it, so that iˆ’s
report is still Di′j with probability 1. Note that the latter is not a well-defined Bayesian strategy,
because i does not have enough information to carry it out. Accordingly, the resulting information
elicitation mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC): that is, all players reporting their
true values and true knowledge is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In fact, this is the only Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in the mechanism, besides the unachieveable ones where each player reports the
unknown true distributions. We again summarize our results in the theorem below.
9Using the standard language from epistemic game theory, player i’s information set contains at least two different
distributions for i′’s value for j.
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Theorem 8. For any information elicitation mechanism in previous sections where the knowledge
graph is at least 1-informed, the revised mechanism does not rely on the no-bluff assumption, and
all players reporting their true values and true knowledge is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, the mechanism’s revenue is the same as before with an ǫ additive loss.
When not everything is known and the players may bluff, a player may not report “⊥” about
a distribution he does not know, because he may still get some reward in case nobody knows that
distribution. It is an interesting open problem to design information elicitation mechanisms when
not everything is known and without the no-bluff assumption.
D Information Elicitation Mechanisms with Efficient Communica-
tion
To improve the communication complexity of our mechanisms, rather than asking each player to
report his known distributions in their entirety, the seller can make specific queries to the players
about the distributions. Indeed, the query complexity of Bayesian auctions has been studied by [18]
very recently, where the seller does not know the prior distributions but is given oracle accesses to
them. More precisely, for any distribution D over reals, in a value query the seller sends a value v
and the oracle returns the corresponding quantile q(v) = Prx∼D[x ≥ v]. In a quantile query, the
seller sends a quantile q ∈ [0, 1] and the oracle returns the corresponding value v(q) such that
Prx∼D[x ≥ v(q)] = q.
In information elicitation auctions, as the players have knowledge about the distributions, it is
very natural for the seller to use them as oracles. However, it is important to ensure that the queries
to the players do not destroy their incentives to be truthful: both to report their true values and to
report their true knowledge.10 Fortunately, truthfulness in our mechanisms can be easily guaranteed
by non-adaptive queries, where all the queries are made together, before the players report their
values. As shown by [18], when the players’ value distributions are bounded within [1,H] for a given
value H, the number of non-adaptive queries enough to approximate OPT in Bayesian auctions is
polynomial in m and n, but only logarithmic in H, which is very efficient. Moreover, only value
queries are needed in this case. When the distributions have unbounded supports but satisfy small-
tail assumptions, non-adaptive quantile queries are enough, and the query complexity is polynomial
inm,n and logarithmic in the cut-off value of the tail. We make the same queries in our mechanisms
as in [18].
Below we show how to revise our information elicitation mechanisms to query the players, using
mechanism MIEUD as an example and for bounded distributions. The mechanism now has a
parameter ǫ > 0, which affects its approximation ratio.
• In Step 1, given ǫ > 0, let k = ⌈log1+ǫH⌉ and ν = (ν0, ν1, . . . , νk−1, νk) = (1, (1 + ǫ), (1 +
ǫ)2, . . . , (1 + ǫ)k−1,H).
Each player i reports, for each player i′ 6= i and item j, either ⊥ or a non-increasing quan-
tile vector qii′j = (q
i
i′j;0, . . . , q
i
i′j;k), where q
i
i′j;0 = 1. Allegedly, q
i
i′j;l = qi′j(νl) for each
l ∈ {0, . . . , k}, where qi′j(·) is defined by Di′j . That is, if (i, i′) ∈ Gj then player i answers the
value queries for distribution Di′j and value vector ν.
Simultaneously, each player i also reports a valuation bi = (bij)j∈M .
10Here a player reporting his true knowledge no longer means that he reports the true distributions, but that he
answers the seller’s queries truthfully.
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• In Step 5, if player i ∈ N1 is the reporter for player i′ ∈ N2 and item j, then construct a
discrete distribution D′i′j as follows: D
′
i′j(νl) = q
i
i′j;l − q
i
i′j;l+1 for every l ∈ {0, . . . , k}, where
qii′j;k+1 , 0.
The other parts of the mechanism remain unchanged.
In the revised mechanism, it is still dominant for the players to report their true values, no
matter how the queries are answered. Indeed, the fact that distribution D′ij is now different from
Dij does not affect the players’ truthfulness in the Bayesian mechanism MUD. Moreover, having
player i answer the value queries for Di′j is equivalent to first having him report Dii′j and then having
the seller answer the value queries accordingly. In the latter, reporting Dii′j truthfully never hurts
player i, because i ∈ N1 when his knowledge is used. Thus answering the value queries truthfully
never hurts i either, and the mechanism is still 2-DST. Because the value queries for a distribution
Di′j may be answered by all the other n−1 players (when they all know Di′j), the query complexity
and thus the communication complexity of our mechanisms have an extra factor n compared with
the query complexity in [18].
More precisely, we state the following theorem for arbitrary knowledge graphs and bounded
distributions. The proof is relatively easy following those for Section 3 and those in [18], thus has
been omitted.
Theorem 9. ∀ǫ > 0,H > 1 and for any auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G),
where each Dij’s support is bounded in [1,H], our revised information elicitation mechanisms are
2-DST and make non-adaptive value queries. Moreover,
• for single-good auctions, with O(n2 log1+ǫH) queries, the mechanism achieves revenue at least
OPTK(I)
4(1+ǫ) ;
• for unit-demand auctions, with O(mn2 log1+ǫH) queries, the mechanism achieves revenue at
least OPTK(I)96(1+ǫ) ; and
• for additive auctions, with O(mn2 log1+ǫH) queries, the mechanism achieves revenue at least
OPTK(I)
70(1+ǫ) .
The case of unbounded distributions with small-tail assumptions, as well as the cases of k-
informed knowledge graphs with k ≥ 1 and bounded/unbounded distributions, are similar. Indeed,
the approximation ratios of our main results and the query complexity of Bayesian auctions in [18]
combine nicely with each other, resulting in crowdsoruced Bayesian mechanisms with very efficient
communication.
To further improve the communication complexity of our mechanisms, the seller can change
them into extensive-form mechanisms and ask each player i to first report a bit about each pair
(i′, j), indicating whether i knows Di′j or not. The seller then selects one reporter and only asks
him to answer the oracle queries. By doing so, the extra factor n in the query complexity of our
mechanisms can be dropped, with the players communicating O(n2m) bits besides the queries.
If scoring rules are used to buy the players’ knowledge, then we can use the following value
scoring rule gV to reward value queries, which follows directly from Brier’s scoring rule [9]. More
precisely, for any value query v ∈ R, letting x be a sample from the underlying value distribution
and q be the answer of a reporter to the query, then
gV (x, q; v) , 1 + 2qIx≤v − q
2.
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To reward the players’ answers to quantile queries, we define the following quantile scoring rule gQ,
which is a variant of the one in [14]. More precisely, for any quantile query q ∈ [0, 1], letting x be a
sample from the underlying value distribution and z be the answer of a reporter to the query, then
gQ(x, z; q) , q arctan z − (arctan z − arctan x)Iz≥x.
Both scoring rules are strictly proper scoring rules with bounded ranges.
E Aggregating the Players’ Refined Insider Knowledge
As mentioned in the introduction of the paper, since the common prior assumption implies that every
player has correct and exact (that is, no more, no less) knowledge about all the distributions, in the
main body of this paper we do not consider scenarios where the players have “insider” knowledge.
Incorrect insider knowledge has been studied in [7, 2, 19, 20, 8] and is not the focus of this paper.
However, sometimes each player may have correct insider knowledge about the other players’ value
distributions11: that is, his knowledge is a refinement of the prior.
Different players’ knowledge, although all correct, may refine the prior in different ways. For
example, when the prior distribution of a player i’s value for an item j is uniform over [0, 100], after
vij is drawn, another player i′ may observe whether vij ≥ 50 or not, and a third player i′′ may
observe whether vij ∈ [20, 80]. Thus, player i′ knows whether vij is uniform over [0, 50] or (50, 100],
depending on his signal; and player i′′ knows whether vij is uniform over [20, 80] or [0, 20)∪(80, 100],
depending on the signal i′′ observes.
The players’ correct knowledge must be consistent with each other and one can obtain an even
better refinement of the prior by combining their knowledge together. In the example above, if
player i′ observes vij < 50 and player i′′ observes vij /∈ [20, 80], then it must be that vij ∈ [0, 20)
and the posterior distribution is uniform in this range. However, neither i′ nor i′′ knows this fact.
Enhanced knowledge graphs. To model the players’ insider knowledge, we equip the knowledge
graphs in the information elicitation setting with information sets. To begin with, for any two players
i, i′ and item j such that (i, i′) ∈ Gj , there is a partition Pii′j of the support of Di′j, representing the
possible signals player i will observe about Di′j. After the true value vi′j is drawn, letting S(vi′j) be
the unique set in the partition that contains vi′j , player i learns the fact that player i′’s true value
for j falls into S(vi′j) and the posterior distribution is Di′j|S(vi′j). More generally, the partitions
may even depend on player i’s own true valuation vi, because vi is part of the information he
has. Because different values are independently drawn, given vi and the information sets observed
by i for different distributions of the other players, i considers their posterior distributions to be
independent.
All our mechanisms remain 2-DST with respect to the players’ refined knowledge, where a
player’s true knowledge is now the posterior distributions known by him. Since the optimal Bayesian
revenue increases when the distributions are refined [4], the expected revenue of our mechanisms
also increases, where the expectation is further taken over the private signals observed by the
players. However, the revenue benchmark is still defined as before: that is, with respect to the
prior and the knowledge graphs, without considering the refinements. An interesting open problem
is to design information elicitation mechanisms whose revenue approximates a more demanding
benchmark — the optimal revenue based on the “aggregated refinement” obtained by combining all
players’ refinements together.
11A similar scenario in the literature of contracts was considered in [13] with different concerns.
36
F Information Elicitation Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
In our main results, the knowledge graphs for different items can be totally different from each other:
player 1’s value distribution for item 2 may be known by player 3, while his value distribution for
item 4 may be known by player 5, etc. When all the knowledge graphs are the same, we say that
the auction has player-wise information: all value distributions of a player have the same “knower”.
With player-wise information, only one knowledge graph G is needed: an edge (i, i′) is in G if and
only if player i knows the distribution Di′ = Di′1× · · · ×Di′m. Such an information setting can also
model arbitrary combinatorial auctions, where each player i’s valuation function vi maps each subset
of items to a non-negative real, with vi(∅) = 0. Thus the distribution Di is over such functions, and
i’s values for two subsets of items can be arbitrarily correlated. Given a combinatorial Bayesian
auction instance Iˆ = (N,M,D = ×i∈NDi), a corresponding information elicitation instance is
denoted by I = (N,M,D, G), where G is a single knowledge graph rather than a vector of graphs.
Player-wise information is a much stronger assumption than (player, item)-wise information,
the information settings considered in the main body of this paper. We mention this model here
mainly for completeness and to facilitate the comparison of our results with the literature. Indeed,
with player-wise information and by randomly partitioning the players into reporters and potential
buyers as we have done in mechanisms MIEUD and M′IEUD, we have a simple blackbox reduction
from Bayesian mechanisms to information elicitation mechanisms. Our mechanism MIEB is shown
in Mechanism 7, whereMB can be any Bayesian mechanism. We have the following theorem, whose
proof is similar to that of Theorem 4 and thus omitted.
Mechanism 7 MIEB
1: Each player i reports a valuation function bi and a knowledge Ki = (Dii′)i′ 6=i.
2: Randomly partition the players into two sets, N1 and N2, where each player is independently
put in N1 with probability q = 1− (k + 1)−
1
k and N2 with probability 1− q.
3: Let N3 be the set of players in N2 whose distributions are reported by some players in N1, and
let D′N3 be the vector of reported distributions.
4: Run MB on the Bayesian instance IˆN3 = (N3,M,D
′
N3
) and the valuation functions bN3 ; and
use the resulting allocation and prices to sell to players in N3.
Theorem 10. For any k ∈ [n − 1], for any combinatorial auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and
I = (N,M,D, G) where I has player-wise information and G is k-informed, if MB is DST then
MIEB is 2-DST; and if MB is BIC then MIEB is BIC. Moreover, if MB is a σ-approximation to
OPT , then MIEB is a τkσ-approximation to OPT .
With player-wise information, a player i’s valuation distribution Di is either “completely known”
or “completely unknown”. Thus for unit-demand auctions there is no need to adopt the COPIES
setting to handle the scenario where only part of Di is reported. As before, the approximation
ratio of MIEB increases as k gets larger and converges to that of the Bayesian mechanism. When
k = 1, it is a 4-approximation to OPT using the optimal Bayesian mechanism as a black-box. Note
that the model studied in [4] is a very special case even compared with the player-wise information
setting: that is, G is the complete graph and k = n − 1. Since τn−1 = n−1nn/(n−1) → 1 −
1
n
when n
gets larger, the revenue of our mechanism essentially matches that of [4] for combinatorial auctions.
Moreover, if the players can observe private signals and refine their knowledge about the prior, then
our mechanism can also aggregate such refinements as in [4]. Finally, we have the following corollary
for arbitrary knowledge graphs (i.e., k may be 0).
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Corollary 2. For any combinatorial auction instances Iˆ = (N,M,D) and I = (N,M,D, G) with
player-wise information, mechanism MIEB with q =
1
2 is a
σ
4 -approximation to OPTK(I) if MB
is a σ-approximation to OPT .
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